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Abstract 
 
The main aim of this thesis was to investigate if individual differences in two parameters of 
selective attention to emotional stimuli, i.e. biased attention to positive stimuli and affective 
control, are predictive of stress resilience. Recent theoretical accounts suggest that these two 
parameters directly impact stress resilience. Prior research has consistently linked deficits in 
attention to emotional stimuli to stress-related disorders such as depression and anxiety. In 
addition, a few preliminary findings indicate that acute and chronic stress results in a 
decrease of attentional flexibility. In contrast, few studies have investigated how individual 
differences in selective attention to emotional stimuli might contribute to adaptive stress 
responses and resilience. 
 
The main aim of this thesis was therefore to improve knowledge about how selective 
attention to emotional stimuli is related to stress resilience. Enhanced knowledge could 
guide prevention and treatment options for stress-related disorders. 
 
Two empirical articles are presented in this thesis. The first article concerns the 
predictive value of biased attention to emotional stimuli on trait stress resilience. 43 healthy 
participants completed a modified dot probe task measuring biased attention to emotion 
(positive, negative) together with measurement of trait stress resilience. The second article 
concerns the predictive value of affective control on stress resilience and emotional 
reactivity to a laboratory stressor. In two studies, 48 and 61 healthy participants completed 
an affective control task with measurements of trait resilience and emotional responses to a 
laboratory stressor. 
 
This thesis discusses the theoretical background and prior experimental evidence 
pertaining to stress resilience and selective attention in the light of biased attention to 
emotional stimuli and affective control as potentially modifying individual differences in 
stress resilience. The discussion is centered on possible consequences of these two aspects of 
 
 
i 
 
selective attention in relation to stress resilience and stress-related psychopathology. The first 
part of the thesis is concerned with models and measurements of resilience. The second part 
addresses models and measurement of biased attention and affective control. In the third part, 
possible pathways between resilience and selective attention to emotional stimuli are 
outlined. In the fourth part, the three empirical studies are presented. Finally, the results are 
discussed in the light of prior findings, methodological issues are contemplated, and future 
directions are suggested. 
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Outline and aims of this thesis 
 
The aim of this thesis was to assess the relation between mechanisms of selective attention to 
emotional stimuli on resilience. The first part of the work consisted an experimental study, 
examining biased attention to emotional (positive, negative) stimuli with resilience in healthy 
participants. In the second part, two experimental studies were conducted, examining 
affective control with resilience in healthy participants. 
 
This thesis is organized as follows: 
 
Chapter 1 – Introduction – The introduction outlines the integrated theoretical 
framework under which the research in this thesis was carried out. 
 
Chapter 2 – Describes models and measurement methods of resilience. 
 
Chapter 3- Describes models and measurement methods of attentional biases and affective 
 
control 
 
Chapter 4 – Describes possible pathways between resilience and selective attention to 
 
emotional stimuli 
 
Chapter 5 – Empirical studies – describe the experimental work: the aims, the hypothesis or 
models tested the set up and the outcomes of four studies. The specific goals of each study 
were the following: 
 
• To investigate the predictive value of biased attention to emotional stimuli on self-rated 
trait resilience.  
 
• To investigate the predictive value of affective control on self-rated trait resilience.  
 
• To investigate the predictive value of affective control on self-rated emotion responses to 
a laboratory stressor.  
 
Chapter 6 – General Discussion and Conclusion – provides a general discussion and 
conclusion of this work; presents its contributions to the field; and indicates directions for 
future research 
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Introduction 
 
Most individuals experience at least one traumatic event during their lifetime (Norris, 1992; 
Norris & Sloane, 2007). In addition to traumatic events, many of us face chronic stressors at 
some point in our life, be it in the form of monetary need, juggling many life-roles at the same 
time, illness, or family conflicts. Although some of us will react to those stressors with 
heightened levels of psychopathology, such as anxiety and depression (Rutter, 1987), or somatic 
symptoms as upset stomach, insomnia and weakened immune system (McEwen & Sapolsky, 
2006), most will manage to meet such challenges in an adaptive way and find their way through 
the event or stressful period with preserved function and without experiencing illnesses 
(Bonanno, 2004; 2005; Bonanno, Westphal & Mancini, 2011). When we adapt well in the face of 
different sources of stress, we are experiencing or expressing something called resilience 
(American Psychological Association, 2013). Each person has their own unique way of 
expressing resilience, and we might be more or less resilient depending on the specific 
circumstances surrounding a stressful event or period. This is due to that resilience stem from a 
multitude of interacting factors that might change over the lifespan (Charney & Southwick, 
2012). Such varying factors related to resilience include for instance socioeconomic status, 
health, and social support (Bonanno et al., 2011; Hobfoll, 2001; Rutter, 1987). 
Two factors that vary over individuals and that are strongly related with resilience are 
 
(1) the amount of positive emotion during and in the aftermath of the stressor, (Tugade & 
Fredrickson, 2004; Ong, Bergeman, Bisconti, & Wallace, 2006) and, (2) the ability to 
identify, realistically evaluate, and face emotional stimuli, and in particular threats (e.g., 
Southwick & Charney, 2011). It has been suggested that these two factors depend in part on 
individual differences in two mechanisms of selective attention, namely attentional biases 
to positive stimuli and affective control (Gross, 1998; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Todd, 
Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012; Troy & Mauss, 2011). 
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Individuals that are more prone to attend to certain stimuli, such as positive stimuli, 
are said to exhibit an attentional bias (AB) to such stimuli (Duncan, 2006; Todd et al., 2012). 
ABs are linked not only to higher attention to specific stimuli, but stimuli also function as 
 
“triggers” of further reactions. Such reactions may include emotions, cognitions and 
behaviors (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Matsumo & Ekman, 2010; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). For 
instance, higher AB to positive stimuli in a stress situation might lead to increased experience 
of positive emotions and cognitions together with reward directed behavior (Yiend, 2010). 
 
Prior research consistently links a higher AB to negative stimuli with stress-related 
pathologies such as anxiety (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergmain, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van 
IJzendoorn, 2007) and depression (Peckham, McHugh, & Otto, 2010). In addition, an AB 
away from positive stimuli has been found in depression (Armstrong & Oljatunji, 2013). 
 
Preliminary findings also suggest that higher AB to positive stimuli is associated with low 
anxiety (Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008), low vulnerability to depression 
(Joorman, Talbot, & Gotblib, 2007) and more experience of positive emotions (Ong et al., 
2006; Tamir & Robinson, 2007). These results suggest that more biased attention to positive 
stimuli might be related to better stress adaptation. However, these studies used indirect 
measures of resilience, such as absence of psychopathology (e.g., Frewen et al., 2008). The 
first study in this thesis therefore directly assessed the relationship between biased attention 
to positive stimuli and stress resilience. 
 
Affective control is the ability to keep task focus in emotional situations and 
disregard emotional distracters (e.g., Egner, 2007). The typical promotion of emotional 
stimuli observed in attentional processing is thought to be adaptive since such stimuli might 
carry important information about threats and rewards (e.g., Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001; 
LeDoux, 2000; Reeck, LaBar, & Egner, 2012). However, individual with lower affective 
control cannot direct attention away from irrelevant emotional distracters, leading to 
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decreased ability to disengage from irrelevant rewards and threats (Ossewarde, Qin, Van 
Marle, van Wingen, Fernandez, & Hermans, 2010). Failure to recruit affective control in 
conflict situations (i.e., situations with conflicting emotional stimuli) can be detrimental 
for the individual. For instance, the prolonged elaboration of negative internal stimuli 
typically seen in depressed subjects has been related with deficits in affective control 
(Goeschke, 2013). Further, affective control may be of particular importance in stressful 
situations as such situations are highly emotional (Sarason, Johson, & Siegel, 1978). 
 
Even though the need for control increases in stressful situations, the typically finding 
is a decrease of attentional control during acute and chronic stress (Liston, McEwen, & 
Casey, 2009; Plessow, Fischer, Kirschbaum, & Goscheke, 2011). Failure of attentional 
control, leading to higher attention to distracters, has been found to increase non-adaptive 
coping, such as over-eating (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Ossewarde et al., 2010) and increased 
worry and intrusions (e.g., Hagenaars & Putman, 2011; Verwored, de Jong, & Wessel, 
2008). However, these studies assessed the impact of stress on attentional control. In 
contrast, whether higher affective control lead to better stress adaptation is not well known. 
Further, these prior studies assessed attentional control to neutral stimuli. Robust findings 
from imaging studies suggest that control of neutral and emotional stimuli are processed in 
distinct circuits (for an overview see Egner, 2007). The relationship between affective (i.e., 
control of emotional stimuli) control and resilience is not well known. Two of the presented 
studies in this thesis therefore investigate whether higher affective control predicted higher 
stress resilience. 
 
Research into stress protective aspects of selective attention to emotional stimuli is of 
particular interest for two main reasons, (i) research about selective attention to emotional 
stimuli in resilient individuals is lacking, and (ii) enhanced knowledge might lead to 
improved prevention and treatment of stress-related disorder (Monk, 2008; Yiend, 2010). 
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This thesis explores the research questions that biased attention to emotional stimuli 
and affective control predicts individual differences in stress resilience. The research 
question was explored in (1) a systematic research review, (2) three experimental studies in 
healthy adults, and (3) a prospective experimental study in medical students that was 
conducted in a functional magnetic resonance camera (fMRI) environment. Empirical papers 
from the three experimental behavioral studies (i.e., 2) are included in the thesis. 
 
This thesis is organized starting with a theoretical background reviewing stress 
resilience (chapter 2), then models and measurements of selective attention (chapter 3), 
followed by an outline of the rationale of the thesis (chapter 4), thereafter two 
empirical papers resulting from the conducted studies are presented (chapter 5), 
followed by a discussion of the results and implications for future studies (chapter 6). 
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Chapter 2 – Resilience 
 
It has been repeatedly shown that although the experience of stressful events are 
associated with an increase in psychopathology and ill health, most individual are resilient, 
i.e. they adapt physiologically and psychological to such events without a long-term 
reduction in functioning (e.g., Bonanno, 2004, Rutter, 1987; Rutter, 1999). Some individual 
might even show improvement of adjustment and personal growth in response to severe 
stress (Cohen, Kessler, & Gordon, 1997). Individual that exhibit successful psychologically 
and physiologically adaptation in response to stressful events are said to show resilience 
(Feder, Nestler, & Charney, 2009). The individual level of resilience might vary over the life-
span and in different situations depending on a range of factors (Bonanno et al., 2011). Such 
factors include for instance age, economic and social resources, genetics and cognitive 
appraisals of the stressor (e.g., Norris, Stevens, Pfefferbaum, Wyche, & Pfefferbaum, 2008). 
Recent years have seen an increase in research interest about protective and vulnerability 
factors and their interaction, since such factors might explain individual differences in stress 
resilience (e.g., Cohen et al., 1997). Knowledge of protective and vulnerability factors related 
to resilience could potentially lead to improvement of prevention and treatments options of 
stress-related disorders. It has been suggested that research about protective resilience factors 
is of high relevance (Yiend, 2010). Without knowledge about how protective factors operate 
in healthy or highly resilient individuals, guidance for treatment and prevention is missing. 
 
 
This chapter introduces definitions and models of stress resilience (2.1) and available 
measurement methods (2.2) of resilience, including markers of resilience that are of 
relevance for this thesis. A brief introduction to genetic and neural markers is provided to 
achieve a broad picture of available measurement methods. 
 
2.1 Definitions and models of stress resilience 
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The Oxford dictionary suggest the following definition of resilience “the capacity to 
recover quickly from difficulties; toughness“(see figure 1). This definition suggests that we 
can use individual differences in time to recover from a stressful event or trauma as a 
quantification of resilience. However, stressors can be diverse (e.g., chronic, acute) and stress 
response involves both physiological and psychological reactions (e.g., McEwen, 2007; 
2010; 2012). A definition of resilience more adapted to psychological research has been 
suggested by Feder and colleagues (Feder et al., 2009, p.446): “resilience refers to a person’s 
ability to adapt successfully to acute stress, trauma or more chronic forms of adversity…and 
continue to demonstrate adaptive psychological and physiological stress responses or 
psychobiological homeostasis”. 
 
Individual differences in resilience are conceptualized in the research literature on a 
continuum from completely stable personality traits to a varying outcome depending on 
interacting factors (e.g., Bonanno et al., 2011; Connor & Davidson, 2003). Resilience is 
measured in response to stressors, and these can be a challenging event, a traumatic situation 
or chronic stressors (McEwen, 2007). Definitions of resilience vary over three major groups: 
 
(i) absence of psychopathology following a stressful period or event  
 
 
(ii) ongoing psychological and physiological functioning is adaptive during and 
following a stressful period or event  
 
(iii) building of resources in the face of stress  
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Figure 1. Individual Differences in Resilience According to the Oxford Dictionary 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Adapted from the definition of resilience in the Oxford Dictionary (2013). 
 
The uses of resilience as a construct in the research literature are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. For instance, resilience defined as maintained functionality over time 
after a stressful event might be due to both a stable trait (i.e., resiliency) and several 
interacting resilience promoting factors. In this thesis it is assumed that individual differences 
in resilience stems from the interaction of a multitude of factors that are more or less stable 
over time, including for instance variations in selective attention, genetic influences, learned 
coping strategies, and socioeconomic circumstances. However, it is also assumed that some 
of these factors are relatively stable, and can be assessed with trait resilience questionnaires. 
 
2.1.2 Distribution of stress resilience after stressful events. Several models suggest 
typical distributions of stress-responses and resilience after a stressful event (e.g., Belsky & 
Pluess, 2009; Bonanno, 2004; Norris, Tracey, and Galea, 2009). These models aim at 
identifying typical response patterns related to resilience in a population, which in turn 
enables identification of resilience factors that characterize individuals that remain resilient in 
the face of adversity. Such factors might stand in a causal relationship with resilience, or co-
occur and thus being markers of resilience. In this section three main models of distribution 
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of resilience after a stressful event are introduced, starting with a presentation of trajectories 
described by George Bonanno (2004, 2005, 2008; Bonanno et al., 2011), followed by 
additional trajectories from Norris et al. (Norris et al., 2009), and thereafter the differential 
susceptibility hypothesis suggested by Belsky and Pluess is reviewed (2009). 
 
2.1.2.1 Trajectories by Bonanno. Bonanno suggested that responses to potentially 
stressful events (PTE) could be described by one of four major trajectories of responses (see 
figure 2); (1) resilience, (2) recovery, (3) delayed reaction, and (4) chronic distress 
(Bonanno, 2004; Bonanno, Moskowitz, Papa, & Folkman; Bonanno, Kennedy, Galatzer-
Levy, Lude, & Elfstom, 2012a; Bonanno et al., 2011; Bonanno, Wortman, & Nesse, 2004). 
The model emphasizes that even though some individuals will develop a stress-related 
reduction of daily function after a PTE, the majority will preserve their pre-event level of 
function (Bonanno, 2004). A main contribution of this model is the shift in focus from 
psychopathology following a PTE, to a view of most people as resilient in the face of 
stressors. The four trajectories are defined as follows: 
 
(1) In resilience only transistent stress reactions are exhibited (to an isolated PTE), and daily 
psychological and physical functioning is largely preserved in a healthy manner.  
 
(2) Recovery is characterized by an upheaval of stress symptoms and impairment in  
 
functioning after the PTE, followed by a return to “pre PTE” levels of functioning. 
 
(3) Delayed reaction is found when stress symptoms appear after a period of relative 
preserved functioning following a PTE.  
 
(4) Chronic distress is chronic psychopathology, either preceding or following the PTE, such 
as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).  
 
Recently, Bonanno and colleagues (Bonanno et al., 2011) have used a statistical 
analysis called latent growth mixture modeling (LGMM) to identify trajectories of responses 
in longitudinal behavioral data. LGMM uses a mix of continuous and categorical data (mixed  
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model) to identify trajectories of growth in a measure over time. For this reasons, this type of 
analysis needs longitudinal data using the same measure in the same individuals over several 
time points. Based on such data, LGMM models the groups that best fit the data (Muthén, 
2004). Using this statistical method, Bonanno and his colleagues have analyzed longitudinal 
data acquired after a traumatic event such as bereavement and terrorist attacks (e.g., Galatzer-
Levy & Bonanno, 2012, 2013; Bonanno et al., 2005; Bonanno et al., 2012a). These studies 
have confirmed that most individual stay resilient after highly stressful events, and the 
additional three trajectories (i.e., recovery, delayed response, and chronic distress) have also 
been confirmed in some if not all analyses. 
 
Figure 2. Trajectories of Responses to a Potentially Traumatic Event 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure adapted from Bonanno, Westphal & Mancini (2011), with additional 
trajectories (i.e., stress improvement and resistance) suggested by Norris et al. (2009) 
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2.1.2.2 Additional suggested trajectories. Norris and colleagues (Norris et al., 2009) 
suggested two additional trajectories following a stressful event, (1) better function after than 
before the stressor or so called “stress-improvement”, and (2) no reaction to stressor, so 
called resistance. In the latter case, the individual seem to cope, and daily function is 
unaffected. However, resistance to respond involves a suppression of all emotional reactions, 
and an authentic acknowledgement of the stressful event is missing (Norris et al., 2009). In 
addition, Bonanno et al. (Bonanno, Boerner, & Wortman, 2008) have suggested a trajectory 
that is characterized by continuous high distress levels that are present over a long period of 
time and precedes the PTE. That psychopathology and difficulties that are unrelated with a 
traumatic event proceed for instance the diagnosis of PTSD have been recently been 
confirmed in a meta analysis of prospective PTSD studies (DiGangi, Gomez, Mendoza, 
Jason, Keys, & Koenen, 2013). The other two suggested trajectories have also been 
identified in longitudinal data, for instance stress-improvement after a divorce (Clark, 
Diener, Georgellis, & Lucas, 2008). 
 
2.1.2.3 Differential susceptibility model. The differential susceptibility hypothesis 
(Belsky & Pluess, 2009) suggests that some individuals are more sensitive or susceptible to 
environmental influences than others. This model builds on the vulnerability model, which 
suggests that some individuals are more sensitive to stressors than others. The differential 
susceptibility hypothesis has been adapted from gene x environment (G x E) interaction 
studies that have found specific “vulnerability - resilience genes” moderated by 
environmental influences, such as parental quality, to be the model that best explains 
resilience and development of stress related disorder. This hypothesis challenges the 
vulnerability model that states that some individuals are more vulnerable to stressors than 
others (e.g., Bakermans-Kranenburg & van IJzendoorn, 2007). Instead the differential 
susceptibility hypothesis suggests that not only are some individual more vulnerable to 
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stressors, but the very same individual profit much more from beneficial environmental 
influences or just the absence of stressors (Belsky & Pluess, 2009) (see figure 3). Stress-
vulnerability is thus not necessarily one-sidedly bad for the individual, but instead indicates 
plasticity (sensitivity) to all environmental influences (Belsky & Pluess, 2009). Plasticity is 
thus “a double-egged sword”, on one hand rendering the individual stress-vulnerable, and on 
the other hand giving an enhanced ability to benefit from beneficial circumstances (Belsky & 
Pluess, 2009). The differential susceptibility hypothesis has crucial consequences for the 
resilience concept, as it states that the individuals that are less resilient after stressors 
outperform their more resilient peers in situations where they are allowed to flourish and 
benefit more from enrichments of the environment as for instance therapeutic interventions 
and treatments (e.g., DeRubeis, Hollon, Amsterdam, Shelton, Young, Salomon, & Gallop, 
2005). 
 
Figure 3. The Diathesis/dual Risk Model and the Differential Susceptibility Hypothesis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: A.) Diathesis/ dual-risk model of individual differences in stress responses, figure 
adapted from Bakermans-Kranenburg and van IJzendoorn’s (2007); B.) Differential 
susceptibility hypothesis of individual differences in stress responses, figure adapted 
from Belsky and Pluess (2013). 
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This hypothesis has been motivated within from an evolutionary point of view, as 
quoted from Pluess and Belsky (2013) “the idea that any form of phenotypic variation in and 
of itself is necessarily positive or negative is an anathema to biology” (Cameron et al., 2005, 
p. 846). From an evolutionary point of view, the future impossible to predict, and the best 
options for any species is thus to have individuals with a range of plasticity to ensure that 
some individuals adapt when circumstances enfold in unpredictable directions (Pluess & 
Belsky, 2013). 
 
The differential susceptibility model has found support in experimental results, 
including genetic, physiological, and behavioral measures (Pluess & Belsky, 2013). For 
example, a variation of the DRD4 gene, that plays a role in attentional and reward 
processed, called the 7-repeat variant, has been identified as a vulnerability factor in several 
studies, for instance linking it with attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) 
(Faraone, Doyle, Mick, & Bieberman, 2001). In studies measuring vantage sensitivity (i.e., 
ability to improve from benign circumstances) in addition to vulnerability, a different profile 
emerges for the carriers of the 7-repeat variation of the DRD4 gene. For instance, a meta 
analysis looking at G x E interactions in dopamine related genes (including the DRD4) in 
children under 10 years, showed that low expressers of dopamine genes are more susceptible 
to environmental influences, being more negatively affected by stressors and profiting more 
from positive interventions (Bakermans-Kranenburg & Van IJzendoorn, 2011). The 
presence of the DRD4 gene in children has been found to predict if the children profit from 
parental intervention to reduce externalizing behavior. Only children with the DRD4 repeat-
7 variation benefited from the intervention, while children carrying other variations of this 
gene, or control groups children, did not change their behavior (Bakermans-Kranenburg, van 
IJzendoorn, Pijlman, Mesman, & Juffer, 2008; Pluess & Belsky, 2013). 
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2.1.3 Distinguishing resilience from stress and coping. Stress, coping and 
resilience are partly overlapping concepts. Below are definitions of stress, coping together 
with an attempt to distinguish these concepts from each other. 
 
2.1.3.1 Stress. Stress in the sense of psychological stress, is a term that was coined by 
Hans Seyle (1955). Seyle modeled his view of stress on a model from physics that show how 
material under increasing strain will become damaged, or stressed, at a certain point
1
. A 
more modern definition of stress states “stress is the non-specific response of the body to any 
demand for change” (American Institute of Stress, AIS; 2007). Further, Lazarus and 
Folkman (1984) introduced the transactional model of stress and coping (1984). This model 
pressed the importance of the evaluation of the demands in a potentially stressful situation 
together with the evaluation of available resources. If an individual evaluates that the 
demands of the situation is exceeding the resources, this leads to increased stress. Thus this 
model emphasizes the individual’s appraisals of both the situation and own resources as 
important for the experience of stress. 
 
However, the research field of stress has developed tremendously and stress 
researchers today use such a diverse set of definitions of stress that it would be difficult if 
not impossible to settle on one definition (Pacak & Palkovits, 2001). Based on the broad 
definition from the AIS, resilience is a particular response to stress characterized of 
preserved functioning in and after stressful events resulting from a multitude of interacting 
factors. 
 
2.1.3.2 Coping. Another concept commonly used in stress research is coping. Coping is 
used to describe the wide range of strategies that an individual use to adapt to stressors. Coping 
as a concept is thus closely related to resilience. Cope is defined by the Oxford 
 
 
1 Selye was born in Austria, and his mother tongue was German. He admitted that he mixed up stress and 
strain when due to language difficulties. When Selye wrote stress, he therefore actually meant strain (i.e., the 
force that strains a material). 
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dictionary as “(of a person) deal effectively with something difficult” (2013). In accord with the 
closeness between the concepts of resilience to coping, many of the factors that are related 
with psychological and physiological coping are likewise related with resilience. 
 
2.2 Measuring resilience 
 
Measuring resilience requires valid and reliable measurement instruments. Several 
options for measurement are in use, including questionnaires and physiological markers. 
An ideal option is to measure functioning and psychopathology at several time-points 
(before and) after a stressful event (e.g., Bonanno et al., 2011). However, cross-sectional 
investigations of resilience have their own benefits. In this section, the available 
measurement options of resilience are briefly presented. Questionnaires are review first 
followed by a chosen number of markers of resilience including psychological, genetic and 
neural markers of resilience. It should be made clear that markers of resilience are not 
direct measures of resilience. Instead, they provide insight into mechanisms underlying or 
related with resilience. Variation in such markers might contribute to individual differences 
in resilience. Markers are included under measuring resilience, because they might 
eventually be proxies for resilience. This section is provided to enable an evaluation of the 
chosen measures in the presented studies of this thesis, and is not meant to be exhaustive. 
 
2.2.1 Questionnaire measures. Questionnaires provide a cost-effective and validated 
measurement of resilience (Windle, Bennett, and Noyes, 2011). Trait resilience 
questionnaires are of particular use in cross-sectional studies, where longitudinal measures of 
resilience are not an option. However, given that the research field of resilience is relatively 
new, no gold standard for measurement of resilience exists, and all available resilience scales 
have been found to require further evaluation (Windle et al., 2011). With that in mind, we 
can conclude that the measurements at this time point are likely to develop and become more 
precise over the coming years. Questionnaire measures attempt to directly assess resilience – 
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some questionnaires adopt a trait view (i.e., resiliency), while other questionnaires use a 
multi-factorial view of resilience including for instance community resources and 
personal competences (Windle et al., 2011). 
 
There are fifteen validated resilience questionnaires that directly assess resilience or 
resiliency (excluding short-scales and revisions) in English language currently in use (Windle 
et al., 2011) (see table 1). A recent review found the quality of all these questionnaires to be 
moderate at the most, with the Connor-Davidson Resilience Scale (CD-RISC; Connor and 
Davidson, 2003) and the Brief Resilience Scale (BRS; Smith et al., 2008) as the best 
validated measures (Windle et al., 2001). The same two scales (CD-RISC and BRS) are 
specifically developed to measures resilience following stressful events (see table for details). 
In the German speaking area, one validated trait resilience questionnaire is currently in use, 
the Resilience Scale (RS; Wagnild & Young, 1993). The RS thus provides a relevant option 
when measuring resilience in the German speaking populations. 
 
Resilience has been found to vary over different population groups. For instance 
resilience measured with the CD-RISC, has been estimated to 80.7 in the general American 
population (Conner & Davidson, 2003). In contrast, psychiatric outpatients had a mean of 
68.0, while a PTSD sample had a mean of 47.5 (Conner & Davidson, 2003). 
 
It is not advisable to compare different resilience questionnaires without considering 
differences in conceptualization. A recent review found that the distribution of resilience, as 
measured with questionnaires, varies between 25-84% over research studies, which might 
be due to the use of different measurement instruments (Vanderbilt-Ariance, & Shaw, 
2008). It has been shown in earlier studies, that scales not yet validated produce more 
positive results (app. 40% more positives), and as none of the available questionnaires 
scales measuring resilience is satisfactory validated, there is a real need of further 
assessment of resilience scales (Windle et al., 2011). 
 
 
15 
 
Table 1. Available resilience questionnaires measuring resilience 
 
Authors Scale Measuring 
   
Barton, 1989 The Dispositional Resilience Hardiness (commitment, control and challenge), evaluates change 
 Scale  
Block & Kremens, The Ego-Resilience Scale Ego-resiliency, trait measure 
1996   
Connor & Davidson, The Connor-Davidson Resilience Clinical measures of stress coping ability (personal competence, 
2003 Scale trust/tolerance/strengthening effects of stress, acceptance of change, 
  secure relationship, spiritual influences) 
Donnon & Hammond, Youth Resiliency: Assessing Protective factors and developmental strengths (e.g., family, community, 
2003 Developmental Strengths peers, work, commitment, school, social sensitivity, cultural sensitivity, 
  self concept, empowerment, self control), assesses “resilience profile” 
Friboug et al., 2003 The Resilience Scale for Adults Protective factors (e.g., personal competence, social competence, family 
  coherence, social support, personal structure), assesses “resilience profile” 
Hurtes & Allen, 2001 The Resiliency Attitudes and Resilience attitudes (e.g., creativity, insight, humor, values), assesses 
 Skills Profile profile of intervention for youth 
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Oshio et al., 2003 Adolescent Resilience Scale Psychological characteristics of Japanese Youth (novelty seeking, 
  emotion regulation, positive future orientation) 
Sun & Stewart, 2007 California Healthy Kids Survey - Student perception of individual protective resources (e.g., 
 The Resilience Scale of the communication & cooperation, self esteem, empathy, problem solving, 
 Student Survey goals, family connection, autonomy, pro-social peers, meaningful 
  participation in community, activity, peer support) 
Smith et al., 2008 The Brief Resilience Scale Ability to bounce back from stress 
Ungar et al., 2008 The Child and Youth Resilience Child and youth resilience across four domains (individual, relational, 
 Measure community, culture) 
Wagnild & Young, The Resilience Scale Individual resiliency- positive personal characteristic (personal 
1993  competence, acceptance of self and life) 
Windle et al., 2008 Psychological Resilience Psychological resilience (self esteem, personal competence, interpersonal 
  control) 
Klohnen, 1996 Ego Resiliency Components of ego-resiliency (confident optimism, productive and 
  autonomous activity, interpersonal warmth and insight, skilled 
  expressiveness) 
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Hjemdal et al., 2006 Resilience Scale for Adolescents Protective resources (personal competence, social competence, structured 
  style, family cohesion, social resources) 
Bromley et al., 2006 Ego Resiliency 2 Ego resiliency (confident optimist, productive activity, insight and 
  warmth, skilled expressiveness) 
 
Note: List adapted from Windle, Bennet and Noyes, 2011. 
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In addition to resilience questionnaires, self-report measures assessing the level of 
stress-related changes and psychopathologies can be used to index resilience (Cohen, Kessler, 
& Gordon, 1997). Such self-report measures include perceived stress (Cohen, Kamarck, & 
Mermelstein, 1983) and measures of symptoms of anxiety (e.g., the State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory; Spielberger, Gorssuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983) and depression (Patient 
Healthy Questionnaire; Spitzer, Kroenke, & Williams, 2001). Resilience is then 
conceptualized as the absence of such symptoms. 
 
2.2.1.1 Floor and ceiling effects. Floor and ceiling effects are the inability of an 
instrument to capture distribution of a certain measurement below or above a certain level 
of the measured construct. A suggested indication of floor or ceiling effect is that more than 
15% of the measured sample (presuming it is a sample that is intended for the scale) has the 
lowest or highest possible score (Windle et al., 2011). Of the mentioned resilience scales, a 
ceiling effect was reported for the California Healthy Kids Survey, all the remaining scales 
did not report either floor- or ceiling effects in the validation article (Sun & Stewart, 2007; 
 
Windle et al., 2011). 
 
2.2.2 Longitudinal vs. cross-sectional measures of resilience. Prospective, multiple 
repeated measures designs of resilience have been recommended throughout the stress and 
resilience literature (e.g., Bonanno et al., 2011; Lepore, 1997). The use of measuring variables 
over several time points optimally proceeding, during and following a stressful event has even 
been suggested as the optimal way of capturing resilience (Bonanno et al., 2011). The advantage 
of quantifying resilience in this way (compared with a single resilience questionnaire) is that it 
enables comparison between baseline measures on variables with measures of the same variables 
after the stressful event. When measured over a longer time period (e.g., 1 year), it is possible to 
capture presumed distribution of resilience in a population, with some individuals showing 
resilience and other perhaps recovery or delayed 
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stress responses. In addition, multiple repeated measurements allows for control of 
chronic stressors and other confounding factors (Lepore, 1997). 
 
Cross sectional studies have their own advantages, among others it is advisable to 
conduct smaller experimental studies before embarking on more costly (both in time and 
economical means) longitudinal studies, to acquire some evidence that supports the 
research hypothesis that is to be investigated further (Lepore, 1997). 
 
2.2.3 Predictors and markers of resilience. Given that resilience is likely to stem 
from many interacting factors, multi-factorial measurement might explain why certain 
individual stay resilient better than resiliency-questionnaires (Bonanno et al., 2011). Factors 
have been found to predict resilience, include (but are not limited to) demographical 
variables (e.g., Bonanno et al., 2011), personality variables (e.g., Bonnano, Rennicke, & 
Dekel, 2005; Carver, Scheier, & Segerstrom, 2010; Gupta & Bonanno, 2010), earlier 
experienced traumas (Breslau, Peterson, Poisson, Schutlz, & Lucia, 2004; Maguen, Lucenko, 
Reger, Gahm, Litz, & Seal, 2010), and experience of positive emotions (Fredrickson, 2001; 
Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004; Cohn, Fredrickson, Brown, Mikels & Conway, 2009). Several 
personality variables have been found to predict resilience. These factors are sometimes, but 
not always, related to factors incorporated in resiliency measurements. Personality traits and 
dispositions that are related with resilience are for instance optimism (Carver et al., 2010) 
and self-enhancement (Bonanno et al., 2005). 
 
As this thesis focuses specifically on selective attention to emotional stimuli, this 
section focuses on predictors and markers of resilience that are related broadly with such a 
topic, leaving out other known predictors as for instance spirituality (e.g., Connor & 
Davidson, 2003). Below the predictors and markers of resilience that are relevant to this 
thesis are reviewed including the psychological factors optimism, high positive emotionality, 
suppression, and then socioeconomically factors and severity of the stressor. Finally, to 
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achieve a holistic picture, a short introduction to genetic and neural markers of resilience is 
 
provided. 
 
2.2.3.1 Optimism. Optimism is the mental approach to evaluation of the present 
situation and future situation with an optimal outcome in mind. The concept can relate to 
both a personality trait and so-called situational optimism (Carver et al., 2010). Higher 
optimism has been related to reduced distress after a wide range of stressors including for 
instance missile attacks (Zeidner & Hammer, 1992), care giving of a severely ill spouse 
(Given, Stommel, Given, Osuch, Kurtz, & Kurtz, 1993; Hooker, Monahan, Shifren, & 
Hutchinson, 1992; Shifren & Hooker, 1995), and progression of acquired immunodeficiency 
syndrome (AIDS) (Taylor, Kemeny, Aspinwall, Schneider, Rodriquez, & Herbert, 1992). It 
has been suggested that optimists cope in a different way than pessimist, and therefore 
experience less distress and better outcome in and after stressful events (Carver et al., 2010; 
Solberg Nes & Segerstrom, 2006). Optimists tend to see opportunities even when situations 
are difficult, and keep their focus on better outcome alternatives. This positive motivation has 
been suggested to create a tendency both to acknowledge and approach ways to achieve 
brighter situation both in the presence and in the future even when the going gets tough 
(Carver et al., 2010). An example of this can be found in women that underwent unsuccessful 
in vitro fertilization. Optimistic women reported that they had benefited from the difficult 
situation in a number of ways including becoming closer to their spouse (Litt, Tennen, Af 
Eck, & Klock, 1992). Further, optimists’ use coping strategies in a different way than do 
pessimist in that they tend to use problem focused strategies in situations that are controllable 
(e.g., exams) and emotion focused strategies in uncontrollable situations (e.g., trauma) 
(Carver et al., 2010).  
 
2.2.3.2 Positive emotions. The interest of the role of positive emotions in contributing 
to resilience is in part spurred by research from the laboratory of Barbara Fredrickson.  
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Fredrickson presented the “broaden-and-build” model stating that positive emotions have 
important evolutionary functions related to both enhanced well-being and a cognitive set 
characterized by broadening of attention and enhanced approach to novelty resulting in learning 
of new skills (Fredrickson, 1998, 2001, 2001). Cognitive processes related to a broader 
perspective must been seen in relation with earlier research showing that confrontation with a 
immediate threat is related to a narrowing of attention in direction of the threat stimuli (Carver, 
2003). The Fredrickson lab has conducted considerate research on the role of positive emotions 
in resilience and found support for the “broaden and build” model. 
 
For instance a study capturing daily mood ratings over a month found support for the 
broaden-and-build model, found positive mood to be the best predictor of resilience, 
unrelated to negative emotions (Cohn et al., 2009). Similar findings with positive mood 
predicting resilience have been found in several studies (e.g., Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002; 
Ong et al., 2006). In addition, positive emotions in bereaved and grieving individuals have 
been found to predict better adjustment later on, also independent on the amount of negative 
feelings at the time of grief (Bonanno & Keltner, 1997; Bonnano et al., 2005). 
 
An additional finding that might be related to resilience is Gottmann’s research into 
marriage success and happiness, where a ratio of 5:1 for positive vs. negative emotions was 
suggested to indicate a good outcome of the marriage (Gottman, 1994). In line with such 
research, it has been suggested that the positive and negative emotion ratio similarly need to be 
over a certain threshold to predict resilience (Fredrickson, 2013). More frequent positive 
emotion predict better resilience outcome, at least until an undefined upper limit (Fredrickson, 
2013). Extremely intense positive emotions, on the other hand, has been found to predict worse 
outcome in different circumstances, for instance in employer creativity (Fredrickson, 2013). 
Based on the mentioned findings, the impact of positive emotion on resilience might be U-
shaped. Low frequency of positive emotion might be related to less 
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resilient outcome, then higher frequency might be increasingly related to higher resilience, 
but at some upper limit more positive emotion might be related to lower resilience. The 
reason for the U-shaped relationship between positive emotion and resilience has been 
suggested to be that the interplay between negative and positive emotions is crucial for 
resilience. Lack of positive emotion, but also lack of negative emotion, leads to worse 
resilience outcomes (Fredrickson, 2013). 
 
2.2.3.3 Suppression of cognition and emotion. Positive emotions might be interpreted 
as suppression of negativity, especially if positive stimuli and emotions are habitually or 
consciously sought out to regulate emotion to more positivity. 
 
However, it has been suggested that suppression of traumatic memories, including 
avoiding “making meaning” of a stressful or traumatic event might constitute an important 
coping strategy in resilient individuals. Early studies of holocaust survivors showed that 
suppression of memories of the holocaust was related to better health, work and family 
situations (Kaminer & Lavie, 1991, 1993). Recent years have seen several finding 
supporting this early result, with less meaning making in resilient individuals (Westphal & 
Bonanno, 2007), and low frequency of individuals actually seeking to make meaning after a 
stressful event (Bonanno, 2013; Davis, Wortman, Lehman, & Silver, 2000). 
 
At first sight, these are quite controversial findings, suggesting that it’s might be better 
to “forget and move on” (if you can) and it has been questioned if the individual and society as 
a whole can acquire knowledge from a repressed and “forgotten” event. However, suppression 
might be an important strategy in response to specific external an internal stimuli, and not as a 
mean of denying an event. Based on a literature review Park (2010) suggested that it is 
important to distinguish between violations of global beliefs, which are related to self and the 
world, and situational beliefs, which are appraisals about a specific event or period that one has 
been through. In the case of violations of global beliefs, it might 
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be an adaptive strategy to focus on making meaning and changing appraisals (Park, 
2010). On the other side, focusing on meaning making about a specific event that one has 
been through, might instead be related to worse outcomes in terms of adaptation to stress 
(e.g., higher depression) (Park, 2010; Sales, Merrill, & Fivush, 2013). 
 
2.2.3.4 Emotional reactivity. More negative affect and affective reactivity has been 
found to predict worse functioning as long as 10 years after the measurement of reactivity 
(Charles, Piazza, Mogle, Sliwinski, & Almeida, 2013). A recent finding showed that 
individual that react with more negative affect, even to minor stressors, are more likely to 
show adverse mental health development (i.e., more psychopathology) (Charles et al., 2013). 
Other findings include that those individuals reacting with more negative emotions show 
more depressive symptomatic in response to study stress (ONeill, Cohen, Tolpin, & 
Gunther, 2004; Parrish, Cohen, & Laurenceau, 2011). 
 
2.2.3.5 Socioeconomic profile of resilience. A resilient profile includes being male, 
highly educated and have older age (Bonanno et al., 2011). In addition, it is by now well 
known that economical factors play an important role in adaptation to stress. Availability of 
resources after a trauma has been repeatedly related to more resilient responding (e.g., 
Bonanno et al., 2011; Brewin, Dalgleish, & Joseph, 1996; Norris et al., 2002). Social 
resources have been found to predict resilience as well, with higher social support being 
beneficial for resilience (Bonanno et al., 2012; Hobfoll, 2002).  
 
2.2.3.6 Severity and timing of the traumatic or stressful event. Research about 
resilience includes a wide range of stressors, from mild stress (e.g., exam stress), over highly 
stressful events (e.g., bereavement) to severe trauma (e.g., genocide). The severity, frequency 
and chronicity of stressors or traumata might require different type of responses and result in 
different impacts on psychological and physiological functioning (McEwen, 2008). The 
severity and continuity of the stressor has repeatedly been related to the percent of  
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individuals that develop stress-related disorders after the trauma (Bonanno et al., 2006: 
Bonanno et al., 2011). As an example, 55.6% percent of individuals witnessing 9-11 attack 
on the twin towers in New York were resilient after six months, compared with 32.8% of 
those injured by the attack (Bonanno et al., 2006). Such numbers point to one important fact: 
the severity of the stressor counts, with more severe stress leading to more stress 
symptomatic across the population (MacEwen, 2008). 
 
The timing of the trauma might impact how severe the influence of the stressor is on the 
individual, as certain times in the development (i.e., early childhood) are more sensitive 
(Karatoreos & McEwen, 2009). It has repeatedly been found that severe stressors in childhood 
impacts resilience later in life, with worse resilience outcome over the whole population (e.g, 
Kyle & Pichard, 2006). A throughout introduction to effects of timing of the stressful event is 
beyond the scope of this thesis (but see e.g., Karatoreos & McEwen, 2009). 
 
2.2.3.7 Genetic markers of resilience. Genes play a part in how vulnerable we are to 
stress, and several genes have been related to stress responses and resilience (Charney & 
Southwick, 2012). Although a complete review of genetic influence on resilience is beyond 
the scope of this thesis, a few findings will be provided. For instance, the norepineprhrine 
response might be associated with variations in the neuropeptide Y gene, and such variations 
are related to individual differences in stress responses. For instance, individual with a gene 
variation related to low expression of neuropeptide Y, have been found to react with increased 
anxiety and amygdale response when presented to threatening stimuli (Charney & Southwick, 
2012; Zhou, Zhu, Hariri, Enoch, Scott, Sinha, et al., 2008). Additionally, a variation of the 
alpha-2 adrenoreceptor gene (i.e., alpha-2cDEl322-325-AR) is associated with increased 
baseline levels of norepinephrine, larger stress-related increase of norepinephrine, as well as 
slower return to baseline levels after the end of the stressor (Neumeister, Charney, Belfer, 
Geraci, Holmes, Sharabi, et al., 2005). Another gene that might affect stress responses over its 
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actions on the sympathic nervous system (SNS) is variation in the serotonin transporter linked 
polymorphic region gene (5-HTTLPR). Being a carrier of the short allele of this gene that 
codes for low expression of serotonin is associated with less resilient responses to stressors 
(e.g., Munafo, Brown, & Hariri, 2008). 
 
2.2.3.8 Neural markers of resilience. It has been suggested that preserved responses in 
those areas involved in cognitive and attentional control as well as reward processing when 
confronted with challenging is characteristic of resilient individuals. 
 
2.2.3.8.1 Prefrontal Regions and Attentional Control 
 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is involved in all voluntary actions, including direction of 
attention (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). It has been proposed that the PFC is involved in emotion 
regulation (including positive emotions) (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). In line with this 
suggestion, higher activation of the PFC is related to higher activation of the amygdale; 
possibly indicating increased efforts to regulate emotion (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). 
 
Attentional control enable modulation of selective attention, for instance away from 
negative and toward positive stimuli. More activity is found in the PFC following successful 
training to direct attention toward a specific type of stimuli (Monk, 2008). For instance, 
individuals with a generalized anxiety disorder (GAD), who participated in a attentional 
retraining to learn how to focus away from threat stimuli, showed larger activation in PFC 
in response to threat stimuli after compared with before the training (Monk, 2008). 
 
Further, it has been found that the prefrontal regulation related to reward circuits is 
reduced following stressors (Ossewaarde, Qin, Van Marle, van Wingen, Fernandez, & Hermans, 
2010). Such reduction might be related to for instance higher probability to give in to short-time 
rewards in stressful situations (e.g., eating sweets) (Ossewaarde et al., 2010), but also to less 
ability to regulate attention away from negative stimuli (Troy & Mauss, 2013). It might thus be 
that preserved prefrontal regulation of attention and emotions constitute an 
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important component of stress resilience. Chronic stress has been found to induce structural 
changes in the prefrontal cortex in human subjects (McEwen, 2012). These changes have 
been suggested to be related with reduced cognitive flexibility dependent on prefrontal 
activation (Liston, McEwen, & Casey, 2009). 
 
2.2.3.8.2 Reward Circuit of the Brain 
 
The reward circuits of the brain, including the medial PFC, the anterior cingulated 
cortex (ACC) and nucleus accumbens, are activated in response to pleasant stimuli, and in 
most individuals the activation is reduced in response to unpleasant or less pleasant activities 
or stimuli (e.g., Hare, Tottenham, Davidson, Glover, & Casey, 2005; Sharot, Riccardi, Raio, 
& Phelps, 2007). For instance activities and stimuli related to food, sex, and positive social 
behavior have been found to elicit responses in this circuit (van Marle, Hermans, Qin, & 
Fernandez, 2009). The actions of the reward circuit are generally related to mesolimbic 
dopaminergic activities in the brain (e.g., Nestler & Carlezon, 2006). Interestingly, it has 
been suggested that the broadening of attention associated with the experience of positive 
emotions is related to an increase of dopamine levels in the reward circuits of the brain 
(Ashby, Kim, Kumar, Lang, & Lozano, 1999; Charney & Southwick, 2012). 
 
Charney & Southwick (2012) proposes that stress reduce responses to pleasurable 
activities and stimuli in the reward circuits of the brain, but that highly resilient individuals 
are characterized by high activity in reward circuits regardless of if they are confronted with 
pleasant or unpleasant stimuli. For instance, in an imaging study with Special Forces soldiers, 
(especially picked out and trained to be resilient) incorporating both loss and win conditions 
(i.e., money), the activity in ACC was not reduced in the Special Forces soldiers in response 
to loss, but healthy control subjects showed a reduction of activity to such stimuli 
(Vythilingham, Nelson, Scaramozza, Waldeck, Haylett, Southwick et al., 2008). 
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Taken together, preserved activation of prefrontal and reward circuits when facing 
 
unpleasant situations and stimuli might be indicative of resilience. 
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Chapter 3 – Selective attention 
 
Clinical cognitive-behavioral models of psychopathology strongly emphasize 
cognition as influencing stress reactions and disorders (Beck, 1978). Cognition is a broad 
concept including all processes involved in processing sensory information. An essential part 
of cognition is attention. An important characteristic of attention is that it includes some 
stimuli at the cost of other; a phenomenon described as selective attention (Cohen, 1993). 
The limited capacity of the attentional system leads to that the direction of attention strongly 
influences our experiences of different situations (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 
2006). Consider the following through experiment suggested by Kenneth H. Heilman (1993, 
In Cohen, 1993, p. vii): 
 
“As you read this, you are probably unaware of how your left foot feels in your shoe. 
Although your brain was receiving sensory input from this foot, you were not aware of your 
foot because you were reading and not attending to it. However, this discussion led you to 
move your attention to your left foot and to become aware of it”. 
 
Research about selective attention and its impact on emotion and behavior rely on 
the assumption that increased selective attention to stimuli result in increased reaction to 
these stimuli (Cohen et al., 1997). The stimuli thus functions as a “trigger” of emotions and 
behaviors (Beevers & Carver, 2003; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Phelps, Ling, & Carrasco, 2006). 
 
A well-known example from the clinical realm, are anxious individuals that exhibit 
biased attention to threat stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). This means that anxious individual 
detect threat stimuli easily, even when the threat is not necessarily relevant and they might 
react to the threat signals with increased anxiety and maladaptive behavioral patterns such as 
exaggerated avoidance (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007). In addition, anxious individuals exhibit 
deficits in regulation of selective attention such that they are prone to be distracted by 
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negative stimuli, i.e. they exhibit deficits in affective control (Bishop, 2009). The lack of 
attentional control increases the inability to regulate the threat vigilance (Bishop, 2009). 
 
Both biased attention and affective control influence where selective attention is 
directed. Biased attention is brought about by increased stimuli representation in sensory 
cortices, resulting in a comparative advantage for stimuli matching such representations in 
the attentional process (Desimone & Duncan, 1995; Duncan, 2006). Affective control, on the 
other hand, is the ability to selectively focus attention to and away from emotional stimuli, 
thus overriding the influence of distracting irrelevant stimuli (Egner, 2007). Attentional and 
affective control is exhibited in accordance with the level of conflict in the environment, with 
higher conflict leading to higher exhibition of control (Egner, 2007). Therefore recent 
research often investigates attentional control under the premise of conflict adaption, which 
takes variations in conflict (e.g., variations in congruency in both previous and current trials 
in the Stroop task) into account. Biased attention and attentional control are distinct aspects 
of selective attention, but have been found to mediate the impact of each other (Botvinick, 
 
Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001). The studies presented in this thesis concerns 
biased attention (study 1) and affective control (study 2 and 3) under the premise of 
conflict adaption in relation to the expression of stress resilience in healthy individuals. 
 
For this reasons, this chapter introduces models of biased attention (3.1), models of 
biased attention in psychopathology (3.2) and models relevant for attentional and affective 
control under the premise of conflict adaptation (3.3). Due to that some of the assumptions of 
this thesis relies on neuropsychological models next follows an introduction to the neural 
basis of selective attention is provided (3.4),. Thereafter, an introduction to measurements of 
selective attention is given, (3.5). Finally overviews of typical findings regarding biased 
attention to emotional stimuli (3.6) as well as affective control (3.7) in healthy and clinical 
populations are provided. 
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3.1. Models of Biased Attention 
 
The predominant model in AB research, the biased competition model (Duncan & 
Desimone, 1996; Duncan, 2006), suggests that representations of stimuli compete for limited 
attentional capacities
2
, leading to the selection of certain stimuli. Representations give rise to 
biased attention, through pre-activation of the neurons wired to that representation (these can 
be very specific, for instance you have specific neurons reacting to your mother), which 
increases sensitivity to certain stimuli (Duncan, 2006). As a consequence of the changing 
content of the working memory, attention biases are contextual and flexible (Duncan, 2006). 
Since there are limits to processing capacity only a slight part of the environment will interact 
with our sensual nerve ends. We selectively attend some information; a sort of “filter” admits 
selective attention (Broadbent, 1958). Or, as Duncan (2006) puts it, “the filter implies that 
competitive winners and losers are determined by task context” (p. 10). 
 
Biases can have a bottom-up or top-down character. Top-down biases are results of 
for instance previous learning or situational framework, while bottom-up biases are seen in 
response to activation of specific features of evolutionary salient stimuli and certain other 
stimuli properties such as familiarity or novelty (Duncan, 2006; Ohman & Mineka, 2001; 
Todd et al., 2012). 
 
When attention is biased to a specific type of stimuli with some consistency, we 
exhibit an attentional bias (AB) to this category of stimuli (e.g., Duncan, 2006). For 
instance, if we exhibit a bias toward stimuli of an emotionally positive valence, we are said 
to have an AB toward positive stimuli. 
 
 
 
 
 
2 Working memory and attentional resources are limited, and therefore an individual capacity to attend to 
stimuli is dependent on priorities as available attentional resources can be exhausted. Exhaustion of 
attentional resources and working memory capacity are related to decrease in performance (Mathews & 
Mackintosch, 1998; Yiend, 2012). 
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ABs thus indicates stronger selective attention to certain aspects of the available 
stimuli in our surroundings (Duncan, 2006). Thereby ABs modifies the “reality 
construction” that shapes our understanding of different situations. 
 
Further, ABs are typically related to responses to the biased stimuli (Cohen et al., 
1997). Emotions and behaviors are thus elicited as a response to the stimuli that function as a 
 
“trigger” (Beevers & Carver, 2003; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Phelps et al., 2006). 
 
Attentional biases to psychopathological relevant stimuli are commonly found 
for instance in anxiety (i.e., threat stimuli) and depression (i.e., self-related sad stimuli) 
(e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Yiend, 2010). 
 
Although considerable literature exists on negative biased attention, research about 
selective attention to stimuli of positive valence is still in its cradle (Herring, Burleson, 
Roberts, & Devine, 2011; Yiend, 2010). Attention to positive stimuli might elicit positive 
emotions like joy, surprise, and amusement. Such feelings are in turn related to approach 
behavior. The experience of positive emotions in general are of importance for activating 
reward-seeking behavior that might lead to for instance finding a partner, social support, 
as well as food and other resources (Matsumoto & Ekman, 2010). 
 
Although sufficient research is lacking (Yiend, 2010), preliminary result point to that 
subjects specifically picked out to have low vulnerability to psychopathology (e.g., scoring 
low on anxiety or depression symptomatic, lacking family history of psychopathology, 
carriers of specific protective genes) might show AB to positive stimuli (e.g., Frewen et al., 
2008; Joorman et al., 2007). 
 
The main models of ABs toward emotional stimuli in the research literature 
are reviewed in this section. 
 
3.1.1 Cognitive effort and ease. Kahneman (2012) has proposed that the mind works in 
two different modes or processes, namely (1) a cognitive system of cognitive ease and (2) 
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a system of cognitive effort. These two systems have different functions, with the cognitive-
ease-system activated during tasks that require little effort, actions and thoughts that “just 
feel right”, while the cognitive-effort-system is associated with effortful analysis and going 
against intuition. Kahneman (2012) suggest that we use cognitive-ease-system in 
circumstances that are familiar, clearly presented, primed and that we experience in a good 
mood. When we use this system, our thoughts are experienced as easy and they feel true, 
familiar, effortless and good. We use the cognitive-effort-system when circumstances feel 
unfamiliar, unclear, and that we experience in a bad mood. Such circumstances are likely to 
be perceived as difficult and uneasy, unfamiliar, false, needing effort or wrong (Kahneman, 
2012). 
 
It has been found that when we are happy we are better at intuitive, associative task, 
while being in a bad mood renders us unable to perform such tasks (Kahneman, 2012). 
Good mood thus goes together with more cognitive ease, and increased reliance on intuition. 
In a good mood we are more creative, and intuitive but also more prone to be deceived by 
superficial solutions and thoughts. Negative moods such as anxiety and sadness go together 
with a more analytic cognitive style and in such moods we are less likely to make logical 
errors (Kahneman, 2012). We also seem to get in a good mood by tasks that produce 
cognitive ease. Kahneman (2012, p. 69) brings the following example. “Briefly consider the 
row triads of words: 
 
 
 
sleep mail switch 
salt deep foam 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33 
 
“You could not know it, of course, but measurement of electrical activity in the 
muscles of your face would probably have shown a slight smile when you read the second 
triad, which is coherent (sea is the solution)”. 
 
Attentional biases related with mood might thus lead to “pattern of deviation in 
thought and emotion” occurring in perception and judgment in certain situations (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Not only individual afflicted with psychopathology exhibit distortions of 
cognition, but all of us are prone to exhibit a range of ABs for characteristics such as 
familiarity and current goals (Kahneman, 2012; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
 
An example of an AB that most of us exhibit to some degree is the confirmation bias 
(Wason, 1960). This bias leads most individuals to favor information that confirms their 
preconceptions or hypothesis. We seek out information that confirms our view of the current 
0conditions and we neglect contradictory information (Kahneman, 2012; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). The confirmation bias can be partly explained with that it is cost-effective 
in terms of cognitive resources. Our attentional capacity is limited, and perceiving the 
environment according to our preconceptions results in reduced ambiguity and therefore less 
cognitive resources are needed to “make sense” of a situation. However, cognitive ease is not 
an indication of that we perceive a situation realistically, it is rather an indication of reduced 
analytic engagement with a specific situation (Kahneman, 2012). 
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Figure 4. Illustration of Confirmation Bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Illustration of the confirmation bias made by Heath Hinegardner. 
 
3.1.2 Biased competition model. The predominant model in AB research, the biased 
competition model (Duncan & Desimone, 1996; Duncan, 2006), suggests that representations 
of stimuli compete for limited attentional capacities over many inter-joined neural systems, 
leading to the selection of certain stimuli. Single cell recordings have shown suppression of 
non-relevant stimuli that takes place about 100-200 ms after stimuli onset (Duncan, 2006). 
Representations of stimuli can be of bottom-up or top-down character. Top-down biases are 
results of for instance previous learning or situational framework, while bottom-up biases are 
seen to evolutionary salient stimuli that and certain other stimuli properties such as 
familiarity or novelty. These representations result in biased attention, and direct the attention 
toward specific stimuli properties. For instance, if a target is primed before trial onset, 
activity is initiated already before the trial (small, sustained activity in the cells that have to 
respond to the stimuli) “potentially the pre-activation could produce a significant competitive 
advantage for those cells” (Duncan, 2006, p. 8). According to the biased competition model, 
as well as extensive experimental evidence, biases can only be detected in experimental 
paradigms creating competition for attentional resources (Duncan, 2006). For instance, biases 
to emotional (vs. neutral) stimuli generally are only seen in paradigms where these stimuli are 
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presented together (e.g., Calvo, Nummenmaa, & Hyona, 2008; MacLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 
1996). 
 
3.2 Models of biased attention in psychopathology 
 
Several models have been presented to explain biased attention in specific 
psychopathologies. Most of these models concern anxiety and depression. A choice of these 
models is presented below. 
 
3.2.1 Negative dysfunctional schemata model. Beck (1976) suggested that negative 
dysfunctional schemata color attentional processes in individuals afflicted by 
psychopathology. This model might still be useful in clinical settings, and is sometimes 
referred to in research literature. However, a recent meta-review (Yiend, 2010) suggested 
that this model no longer could be claimed to accurately describe experimental findings. The 
negative dysfunctional schemata view predicts that the influence of schemata will be similar 
over all psychopathologies and all dysfunctional schemata, but this has been shown not to be 
the case (Yiend, 2010).  
 
3.2.2 Two-stage theory. The two-stage theory (William, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1988) has helped explain a crucial difference in biases found in anxious and 
depressed populations. ABs in anxious populations have been found predominantly after 
short presentation times, while biases in depressed populations appear after longer 
presentation times (e.g., Peckham et al., 2010). In contrast with earlier models of biased 
attention in psychopathological groups, the two-stage theory separates biases arising from 
distortions in priming and elaboration. Priming stands for the activation of representations of 
stimuli that makes such stimuli more accessible, and according to the two-stage theory 
anxious individuals have constantly active representations of threat stimuli, that make such 
stimuli more accessible at all times for such individuals (Williams et al., 1997). Elaboration 
stands for later processing, such as retrieval that involves activation of connections of  
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representations. For instance, the mood-congruent ABs to sad stimuli in depression are 
thought to be biases of elaboration rather than in priming (Williams et al., 1997). 
 
The two-stage theory proposed that traits, like trait resilience for instance, impact the 
attentional process through modifying resource allocation resources so that a trait – congruent 
processing of stimuli is increased. Trait resilience would therefore increase processing of 
resilience-promoting stimuli. State mood, on the other hand, modifies affective decision 
mechanisms, which evaluates the emotional valence of stimuli. For instance, higher positive 
mood would lead to evaluation of positive stimuli as more intensively positive than when in a 
less positive mood. 
 
3.2.3 Cognitive-motivational analysis. The cognitive-motivational analysis (Mogg  
 
& Bradley, 1998) is divided in a “valence evaluation system” (VES) and a “goal engagement 
system” (GES). In this system, the GES is a default state, which keeps the individual on track  
 
to achieve its goal. GES is predominantly directed toward positive, rewarding stimuli that 
signalize goal attainment. The attentional tuning from the GES system is only interrupted 
when a stimuli is intensive enough (for instance due to its evolutionary salience) to set off the 
VES. The importance difference from the two-stage theory is that trait and state (as well as 
additional factors such as context) impacts the sensitivity of the VES system. Thus, 
according to the cognitive-motivational analysis dysfunctional ABs are found in the extremes 
of a sliding scale from very sensitive to very insensitive in terms of VES response. 
 
3.3 Attentional and affective control under conflict adaptation 
 
Attentional control is the ability to direct attention to and from stimuli, including the 
ability to stay focused on task relevant stimuli and ignore distracters (Egner, 2007; Gray et al., 
2009). There is ample evidence from imaging studies showing that control to neutral and 
emotional stimuli is processed in overlapping but distinct neural circuits (Etkin, Egner, & 
Kalisch, 2011; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2005). It might therefore be wise to 
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divide attentional (i.e., to neutral stimuli) and affective control, i.e. attentional control to 
emotional stimuli (e.g., Egner, 2007). In the presence of emotional distracters, the individual 
level of affective control influences how well the individual can discharge such distracters 
and stay on task. 
 
However, both attentional and affective control can be fitted under a larger umbrella 
term of „cognitive control“. Cognitive control is the ability to adapt behavior to reach an 
internal goal. It involves a range of different abilities such as working memory ability to 
keep current goals active and avoid distracters, producing and monitoring task strategy, and 
flexibly adapt behavior to feedback during the course of goal pursuit (e.g., Goeschke, 2014). 
 
Attentional control is exhibited in accordance with the level of conflict (Botvinick et 
al., 2001). This means that attentional control increases when more control is needed, as in 
situations with an increasing level of stimuli conflict. This perspective has been put forth in a 
recent model; the cognitive control loop model (Botvinick et al., 2001). This thesis concerns 
affective control within the premises of conflict adaption, and this section will therefore 
specifically cover models concerned with attentional control within the framework of 
conflict adaptation, including the conflicting models of control loop and feature integration. 
 
As attentional control is used interchangeable for control of both neutral and 
emotional stimuli in the relevant models the introductions fuses these concept. Differences 
in processing of neutral and emotional stimuli in relation with control are further discussed 
under neutral models of selective attention. 
 
In the following section the main model of attentional control under conflict 
adaptation, the cognitive control loop model, is presented. Thereafter, an alternative model, 
the feature integration theory, is outlined, and finally a discussion of conflict adaptation and 
feature integration might influence measures of congruency sequence effects is provided. 
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3.3.1 The conflict control loop. The conflict control loop model concerns the ability of 
selective attention to flexibly adapt to variation in the level of conflict in the surroundings 
through increasing or decreasing the exhibition of attentional control (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
 
The main asset of this model is the focus on how “intervention of control processes are 
brought about” (Botvinick et al., 2001; p. 624) in contrast to how attentional control 
influences different parameters (Botvinick et al., 2001). Conflict resolution is mediated by the 
immediate presence of conflict in preceding trials. For instance, performance to incongruent 
trails is enhanced if the previous trial was incongruent as well. This effect is called the 
congruency sequence effect. In the conflict control model, conflict is detected by a conflict 
monitor system that in turns increases cognitive conflict efforts leading to a higher level of 
exhibited control. Imaging studies contrasting low and high conflict trials have supported this 
division (i.e., the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex is involved in conflict monitoring and the 
lateral prefrontal cortex in conflict resolution) (Etkin et al., 2011; Etkin et al., 2005). 
 
According to this model, attentional control is recruited to a higher degree when more 
attentional control is needed, such as when task difficulty increases. Supportive evidence 
come for instance from studies with the Stroop task showing that interference is larger for the 
initial trials in each block when using block designs (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). Further, it 
seems that adjustment of the level of attentional control occur for instance in response to 
errors, as performance tend to improve thereafter (e.g., Botvinick et al., 2001). Building on 
such findings, the model of conflict monitoring suggests that a “regulative dimension” is 
essential for the exhibition of attentional control (Botvinick et al., 2001). Botvinick and 
colleagues (2001) refer to this dimension as conflict monitoring. 
 
Conflict monitoring ensures that the level of attentional control is adapted to the 
immediate task need and is thus essential for an adaptive exhibition of attentional control. It 
is suggested that the conflict monitoring system is involved in an ongoing evaluation of the 
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level of conflict in the surroundings and constantly passes this information to centers that are 
involved in attentional control. Attentional control is thus governed by an ongoing feedback 
system involving evaluation that aids conflict monitoring and exhibition of attentional 
control (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
 
The conflict-monitoring model has received strong support from imaging, single unit 
and event-related studies. Attentional control is commonly related with the ACC and this 
area has also been found to respond in the majority of conflict studies (Botvinick et al., 
2001). For instance, the ACC is activated when responses has to be overrode, as in the Stroop 
task, where early studies showed higher ACC activation is found in incongruent compared 
with congruent trials (Pardo, Pardo, Janer, & Raichle, 1990). 
 
Conflict adaptation has been found in Stroop task studies when trial-type frequency 
effects are analyzed. This effect shows that interference is lower (i.e., the difference in RT 
from congruent trials) when incongruent trails are more frequent (Botvinick et al., 2001). 
 
Botvinick and colleagues (2001) interprets this effect as evidence that attentional control 
resources are allocated to changes in conflict, such as that attentional control is higher in the 
current trial if it precedes an incongruent trial. The findings from studies of conflict 
monitoring have important implications for the measurement of individual differences in 
attentional control, as it indicates that the level of conflict should be taken into account when 
measuring individual differences in attentional control. 
 
3.3.2 The feature integration theory. Treisman and Galde (1980) suggested that 
details of visual features (e.g., color, orientation, brightness) are processed in a fast parallel and 
automatic manner while more complex stimuli require slower serial searches. More complex 
processing includes “conjunctions of features”, which means that complex stimuli are put 
together by identifying several characteristics in following visual searches (Treisman & Galde, 
1980). The features of an object are first examined in different, parallel feature 
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maps, and the integration takes place later through spatial attention and top-down 
mechanisms (e.g., Zmigrod & Hommel, 2012). Further, the feature integration theory 
assumes that integrated information about an object is saved for a time in so called object 
files (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). For instance, if an object appears in a particular spatial 
location, this particular feature is saved (together with other information) in the object file. 
Consequences can be seen for instance as shorter RT to objects presented in the same spatial 
location repeatedly. This model also has support from research showing that detection of 
certain characteristics, such as color, is not dependent on the number of distracters, while 
the search time is dependent on number of distracters for complex stimuli (Yiend, 2010). 
Neuroimaging studies have confirmed that repeated presentation of a feature activates the 
neural representation of that feature together with the features that were presented together 
with it in earlier trials (Keize, Nieuwenhuis, Colzato, Theeuwisse, Rombouts, & Hommel, 
2008; Zmigrod & Hommel, 2012) 
 
Different suggestions have been made to explain how feature integration effects arise. 
An early account suggested neural convergence such that combination of features (e.g., a 
certain color and direction) would activate a network of neurons (e.g., Barlow, 1972; 
Zmigrod & Hommel, 2012). Later suggestions include temporal synchrony, which states that 
neurons related to a specific event (object event) fire in a common rhythm across the brain 
(e.g., Engel & Singer, 2001). The latter model has been supported by substantial neural 
evidence (for an overview see e.g., Zmigrod & Hommel, 2012). The current stand is that both 
neural convergence and synchrony influence feature integration, but that these mechanisms 
are relatively unaffected by each other (Zmigrod & Hommel, 2012). Zmigrod & Hommel 
(2012) writes, in an illustrative example, that neural convergence might represent learning 
effects, such as the well-known feature conjunction of yellow color and a banana. Such 
 
“over learned” feature conjunction lead to faster processing of this particular feature 
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combination. However, to allow for flexibility of feature integration, other related 
combinations must be possible even if less likely. In such cases, synchrony might play a more 
prominent role, activated along with more established feature conjunctions (Zmigrod & 
Hommel, 2012). 
 
3.3.3 Integration of attentional control and feature integration. It has been 
suggested that feature integration is influenced by intentional attention (e.g., Hommel, 1998; 
2007). In line with such suggestions, it has been found that feature integration bindings (i.e., 
bindings between different features in an object file) are stronger if certain features are task 
relevant. However, this holds true only for some feature types including shape and spatial 
location
x
, while task relevance of other features, such as color, leads to weaker bindings 
(Hommel et al., 2004). Recent evidence has supported that attentional control affects feature 
integration, but suggests that this such influence might be specified to certain aspects of 
feature integration, such as retrieval of recent bindings (Hommel, Memelink, Zmigrod, & 
Colzato, 2013). Further, in a recent paper, Hommel et al. (2013) suggests that attentional 
control (i.e., here: task relevant attentional control) results in priming of task relevant features 
and make such features efficient cues of retrieval. 
 
3.4 Neural foundation of visual selective attention 
 
Theories of selective attention, including theories of biased attention and affective 
control, are often grounded in research stemming from imaging studies and other studies 
including neural measures (i.e., single units, event related studies). Thus, even though the 
studies presented in this thesis do not include such measures, a general understanding of the 
neural basis of selective attention is essential to interpret the results. Therefore a brief 
introduction to the neural foundation of selective attention is provided in this section, starting 
with a an introduction to how sensory stimuli are transferred to and handled in visual cortex 
(3.3.1), followed by the neural basis of biased attention (3.3.2) and finally routes for 
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attentional and affective control are reviewed (3.3.3). This section is not exhaustive, but 
rather intended at giving a general introduction to the research underlying the studies 
presented in this thesis. 
 
3.4.1 From visual stimuli to visual perception. Visual attention is dependent on 
different parts of the eye facilities. Visual perception is created by light falling on the retina, 
a thick layer of cells at the back of the eye. From the retina, visual information is transferred 
through the optic nerve from where it is forwarded to the optic chiasm. At the optic chiasm 
there is a partial crossing of axons (so that information from the retina of both eyes are 
transferred together thereafter). The optic tract is attached to the optic chiasm and wraps 
around the midbrain and reaches the lateral geniculate nucleus (LGN) where all axons 
synapse. Thereafter the axons form fan-like matter throughout the white matter before it 
finally reaches the primary visual cortex in the back of the brain (e.g., Dragoi, 2013). 
Damage to any part of the optic pathway causes blindness in the affected individual, although 
some visual signals still are processed outside of reach of consciousness (i.e., blind vision
3
) 
(e.g., Dragoi, 2013). 
 
3.4.1.1 Primary and secondary visual cortex. The primary visual cortex (V1/Brodmanns 
area 17), or striate cortex, is located in the posterior occipital lobe of the brain. Neurons in the 
LGN projects to V1, that in turn projects further to the secondary visual cortex (V2/ Brodmann´s 
areas 18 and 19). V1 and V2 are both organized in layers, with substantial inter layer projection 
as well as projections from V1 to V2. Neurons in V1 and V2 are divided in simple and complex 
cells, depending on if their actions are simple or complex (Huber & Wiesel, 1959, 1962). Both 
simple and complex cells respond to incoming light that matches a certain position (common in 
simple cells), shapes or orientation (simple and complex cells), direction (complex cells) and in 
some cases color (i.e., in blobs). The neurons of the secondary visual cortex are more diverse 
then in V1, and additional complex processes 
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are thought to take place in V2 such as the activity of so called hyper-complex cells, that for 
instance react to lines of a specific length (e.g., Dragoi, 2013). These cells are hyper-complex 
because they use information from several less complex cells and form abstractions based on 
the addition of information. The hyper-complex cells have access to information from other 
simpler cells through joint axons on a single neuron (e.g., Dragoi, 2013). 
 
3.4.1.2 Visual association cortex (V3, V4, V5). Projections in the visual cortex follow 
a hierarchical pathway from V1, over V2 and further via the other visual cortexes V3, V4 and 
V5. Less is known about the function of neurons in V3, but neurons here are involved in 
orientation, motion and depth detection (e.g., Dragoi, 2013). V4 has many neurons that are 
color sensitive, and is therefore thought to be involved in color perception. In addition, 
neurons here detect for instance orientation and other aspects of spatial visual perception 
(e.g., Dragoi, 2013). The middle temporal area (MT), or V5, has neurons involved in motion 
detection (e.g., Dragoi, 2013).  
 
3.4.1.3 Projections from V1 and V2. Cells from V1 and V2 project into two major 
cortical systems, called the dorsal and ventral pathway. For instance, layer 4B in V1 projects 
to V2, from where projection goes further to V3 and MT in a magnocellular pathway (dorsal 
pathway; e.g., Dragoi, 2013). Other cells in V2 get projections from blob and inter-blobs of 
regions 3 and 4 of V1, and projections are then sent further to V4 as part of the parvocellular  
 
pathway (ventral pathway; e.g., Dragoi, 2013). The division of these two cortical systems 
might be somewhat arbitrary, as they are partly overlapping (e.g., Dragoi, 2013). However, 
schematically the dorsal pathway is thought to feed the parietal lobe that is implicated in 
locating objects (e.g., Dragoi, 2013), while the ventral pathway feed mainly to temporal lobes 
implicated in recognition of objects (e.g., Dragoi, 2013). 
 
3.4.2. Neural circuits of biased attention. Simplified, two main routes for biased 
attention can be singled out; (i) a rapid threat detection amygdala based route that further 
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amplifies sensitivity in visual cortices, leading to a non-specific attentional preparedness 
(e.g., van Marle et al., 2009), and (ii) a route for top-down biased attention over dorsolateral 
pathways from the posterior parietal cortex to dorsal prefrontal cortex (e.g., Hollander & 
Gallagher, 2004). This second pathway is thought to be involved in keeping working 
memory au pair with current goals and tasks (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). 
 
Rapid threat orientation results in a general preparedness, and this state are associated 
with a likelihood of false positives (i.e., we sometimes detect threats where there are none) (van 
Marle et al., 2009). The neurophysiologic response to threat of the amygdale, have been found to 
further increase sensitivity of visual pathways and face processing areas (i.e., fusiform gyrus), 
inducing a highly sensitive but non-specific attentional preparedness (van Marle et al., 2009). It 
has been argued that early threat detection and detection of emotional conflict are both activates 
bottom-up processes (Etkin et al., 2011; van Marle et al., 2009). 
 
The dorsolateral pathway for top-down biased attention is not related to emotional 
valence in first hand, but to the match of processed stimuli features with representations 
activated by the current task (Banish et al., 2001). Such top-down biased attention for 
emotional stimuli is likely to involve integration of emotional and cognitive aspects, 
processes that have been suggested to involve the ACC and lateral prefrontal areas (Gray, 
Braver, & Raichle, 2002; Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). 
 
The processing of face stimuli provides a relevant example of how biased attention 
functions in a neural dimension. Face stimuli are evolutionary salient stimuli that are likely to 
evoke both bottom-up and top-down biases (Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991; 
Rousselet, Mace, & Farbe-Thorpe, 2003). Face processing involves several brain regions, 
including the retina, the LGN, the fusiform gyrus (FG), the amygdale, the ACC and the 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). Within this large system, several 
sub-circuits exist that are thought to be involved in specific aspects of visual face processing. 
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Intensively threatening disgusted or fearful expressions are processed through a very 
rapid detection circuit, that is activated in response to specific visual characteristics (e.g., 
shape of eyebrows; Lundquist, Esteves, & Ohman, 1999) (Ohman & Mineka, 2001). An 
alternative route for rapid threat detection that includes a subcortical pathway to the 
amygdale, over the superior colliculus and pulvinar thalamus has been suggested (LeDoux, 
2000; Phelps & Ledoux, 2005; Vuilleumier, 2005). For less salient face stimuli, it seems that 
the amygdale “evaluates” the relevance of the stimuli, and modulates visual attention through 
feedback systems over the visual cortex (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). 
 
Amygdale activation to both unattended and attended threat stimuli have been found 
in imaging studies, although the response is milder when the stimulus is unattended (Holme, 
Vuilleumier, & Eimer, 2003; McCarthy, 2000). For happy face stimuli in contrast, responses 
of the amygdale is seen only when the stimuli is attended to (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; 
Williams, Moss, Bradshaw, & Mattingley, 2005). 
 
Biased attention to face stimuli goes together with increased responses in frontal areas 
(i.e., ventromedial prefrontal cortex) and parietal spatial attention networks (Armony & 
Dolan, 2002; Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). The prefrontal activity is attenuated with amygdale 
reactivity to emotional stimuli. Further processing related to detailed emotion detection of 
facial expressions is likely to be found in cortical pathways and include regions in occipital 
and temporal neocortex (e.g., fusiform gyrus and superior temporal sulcus) (Adolphs, 2002a, 
2002b; Palermo & Rhodes, 2007). 
 
3.4.3 Neural circuits of attentional and affective control. Attentional control can be 
conceptualized as the ability to discharge irrelevant distracters. Affective control is thus the 
ability to discharge irrelevant emotional distracter. Recent evidence speaks for different 
neural routes involved in resolving interference from neutral and emotional stimuli (i.e., 
emotional distracters) (e.g., Egner, Etkin, Gale, & Hirsch, 2008). In particular, research from 
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imaging studies has contributed to insight in this field. There is by now a wealth of research 
showing that conflict resolving is associated with lateral prefrontal cortex activity (Egner, 
2007). However, recent research shows that a different route may be responsible for 
resolving conflict involving emotional stimuli. The emotional conflict route is suggested to 
involve the rostral anterior cingulated cortex inhibiting amydala responsiveness to task-
irrelevant emotional stimuli. We thus have two conflict resolving neural circuits; (1) a lateral 
prefrontal “cognitive control” circuit that resolves conflict arising from non-emotional 
stimuli, and (ii) a rostral anterior cingulated “emotional control” system that is involved in 
resolving conflict stemming from emotional stimuli, and that is associated with decreased 
amygdala response to emotional distracters (Egner et al., 2008). In addition, Egner et al 
(2008) suggest that the dorsal anterior cingulated is engaged in conflict-detection involving 
both emotional and non-emotional conflict. Conflict resolution involving neutral and 
emotional distracters thus is likely to be governed by both overlapping and distinct neural 
circuits (e.g., Egner et al., 2008). These circuits seem to be effected differently by 
psychopathology (e.g., Monti, Weintraub, & Egner, 2010). 
 
3.5 Measuring selective attention 
 
Visual selective attention tasks can be divided based on the main type of tasks 
involved. The major groups of task belong in either of four categories; visual search and free 
viewing, filtering, multiple, and cueing tasks (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012; Yiend, 2012). 
These categories are described below. The Stroop task and the Dot-Probe task are described 
in some detail as these modifications of these tasks were used in the studies presented in this 
thesis. Further, an introduction to how variations in presentation time might influence the 
interpretation of results from selective attention tasks is provided, along with limitations 
with response time measures. 
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3.5.1 Visual search and free viewing tasks. Visual search task involve that the 
participant searches for a target, typically a specific target in an array or distracting stimuli. 
The time until finding the target is commonly used as a measure of selective attention 
(Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). The participant either has to respond upon finding the target, 
or eye tracking is used. In the latter case, time until first fixation is commonly used to 
quantify individual differences in biased attention (Armstong & Olatunji, 2012). In free 
viewing tasks a visual stimulus is presented and the participant views the image without 
specific instructions. Eye gaze is captured during the free viewing. Measures from free 
viewing include initial gaze orientation at stimulus onset as well as sum of fixations (when 
two stimuli are simultaneously presented) on the emotional versus neutral stimulus.  
 
3.5.2 Filtering tasks. In filtering tasks, a target is presented among one or several 
distracters. Interference of the distracters on response time is commonly used as a 
quantification of bias. The Stroop task is a well-known paradigm in this category (Stroop, 
1935). In the classic Stroop task, the participant have to report the color of a presented text, 
while the text is either color congruent (the word blue is written in blue text) or color 
incongruent (blue is written in red text). The responding is typically slower in incongruent 
trials in healthy participants, due to inference from the semantic meaning of the text. 
Interference is typically larger in psychopathological populations (e.g., dementia), with larger 
differences between congruent and incongruent conditions in such participants (Yiend, 
2010). In a modification of the Stroop task, the emotional Stroop task (Williams, Mathews, & 
MacLeod, 1996), interference is typically larger when the text has an emotional meaning 
(e.g., disease) compared with trials where the text has a neutral meaning (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007; Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Methodologically, blocked designs have been 
found to produce more reliable behavioral results with the emotional Stroop task (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007).  
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3.5.3 Multiple tasks. Multiple tasks involve several tasks that are competing for 
attentional resources. Often two or several tasks, that all appeal for response, are presented 
in temporal proximity. Responses are likely to be biased toward one task, since it takes time 
to disengage and shift attention toward the next (Yiend, 2010). A typical multiple task is the 
attentional blink task (Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). The subjects are instructed to 
respond to two different targets that appear with some temporal distance in a row of other 
visual stimuli. The time between the presentations of target one and two is varied, as it has 
been shown that the target two is often missed when presented with short temporal distance 
after target one. This phenomenon is called “attentional blink” (Yiend, 2010).  
 
3.5.4 Cuing tasks. In cuing tasks a specific location is cued with the presentation of a 
certain stimuli, after which a target appears at this or another location to which the participant 
have to react. Time to respond or accuracy of responses is used as quantifications of ABs in 
such tasks (Yiend, 2010). A typical cueing task the Dot Probe task (DPT). The DPT was first 
described by MacLeod and colleagues (McLeod, Mathews, & Tata, 1986). The task measures 
selective allocation of attention by measuring response RT to a target following the 
presentation of stimuli pairs, with one emotional and one neutral stimulus, in a number of 
successive trials. The participant has to respond as fast and accurate as possible to the target. 
AB scores are created by subtracting RT from emotional trials from RT from neutral trials 
(MacLeod et al., 1986). If the target appears at the location of the stimuli where the attention 
is located, the reaction time will be shorter than if the target is located on the opposite side of 
the attended stimuli (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980; Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, & 
De Bono, 1999). A schematic trial in this task consists of the presentation of a matched 
stimuli pair (e.g., one emotional and one neutral face), followed by a target presented at the 
spatial location of one of the stimuli pair. In the initial versions of this task, the target was a 
dot, hence the name dot-probe task (MacLeod et al., 1986). The target appears with equal  
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probability at the location of the two stimuli types in a stimuli pair. Thus differences in 
selective attention (i.e., differences in RT) to two groups (e.g., emotional and neutral) of 
stimuli can be inferred by comparing RT. AB indexes are usually created using RT data, by 
subtracting the RT to one stimuli group from another. Typically RT from emotional trials 
(e.g., happy faces) is subtracted from neutral trials (e.g., neutral faces) resulting in an AB 
score indicating selective attention toward or away from emotional stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). If mean RT in trials where the probe is under the emotional stimuli is subtracted from 
the mean RT in trials where the probe is under the neutral stimuli, a positive AB score 
indicates selective attention to emotional compared to neutral stimuli. 
 
3.5.5 Presentation times 
 
Different presentation times might partly capture different aspects of selective 
attention, such as orienting, engagement, and disengagement, which might influence the 
selective attention process (Clarke, MacLeod, & Guastella, 2013). When interpretations are 
made related to presentation time of the stimuli, the interpretation are usually based on 
models describing attentional processes as occurring along three temporal stages; (1) 
engagement with specific stimuli that are preferred over other stimuli based on stimuli type 
or location, (2) shifting of attention between different stimuli, and (3) disengagement from 
stimuli thus ending the preferential processing of a specific stimuli or location (Clarke et 
al, 2013; Posner et al., 1980). Shorter stimuli presentation may thus capture orienting to or 
the capturing ability of specific stimuli, while longer presentation times might capture 
engagement with specific stimuli (Bradley et al., 1998). More specifically, masked stimuli 
presented around 15-20 ms are subliminal and responses to targets after such stimuli might 
reflect biases in orienting. Conscious perception of stimuli occurs at presentation times 
around 100 ms (Posner, 1980), although goal directed deployment of attention may not be 
possible at such short presentation times. It takes about 200-300 ms to switch selective 
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attention from one stimulus to another (Kenler, 1995), and presentation times shorter than 
200 ms might thus reflect either capture or engagement with a specific stimulus. Longer 
presentation times, such as beyond 300 ms might reflect engagement, and presentation times 
above 1000 ms might reflect goal directed deployment of attention or elaboration (e.g., 
Yiend, 2012). 
 
3.5.6 Stimuli characteristics 
 
The most common stimuli in visual selective attention research concerning affective 
processes are faces (e.g., Joormann et al., 2007) and words (e.g., Jongen, Smulders, 
Ranson, Arts, & Krabbendam, 2007), but other stimuli have also been used, such as 
landscapes (e.g., Shane & Petersen, 2007). Some studies have employed stimuli related to a 
specific pathology, such as pain-related words for populations afflicted with chronic pain. 
 
Differences in impact between word and picture stimuli have been highlighted (Holmes & 
Mathews, 1984). Word stimuli require semantic interference and images could thus be more 
potent (Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998). Moreover, images are more likely to evoke 
evolutionary salient orienting responses (Ohman, 1993), as the morphology of a word does not 
carry any threat or reward information in itself. Another argument brought forward in favor of 
using images is that words are more likely to be used, and to be overly used when they are 
especially relevant in a specific group (e.g., anxious individuals use threat words more often), 
possibly interfering with group related responses (Bradley et al, 1998). 
 
The target can also be varied, with newer studies often using different geometrical 
shapes. More recent studies often require participants not only to respond to the target, but 
also indicate the position or the shape of the target (e.g., two horizontal dots or two 
vertical dots) (e.g., Pourtois, Thut, Grave de Peralta, Michel, & Vuilleumier, 2005). 
 
Image sets may include several images of the same emotional valence (e.g., several 
positive images). Typically, validated images or words are used, such as the NIMSTIM facial 
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stimuli that includes ratings of valence intensity calculated (Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, 
McCarry, Nurse, Hare, et al., 2009). Differences in the intensity of the emotional valence 
might have implications for results, as higher intensity of negative social images have 
been shown to capture and hold attention more than less intensive images, especially in 
healthy participants (Mogg, Garner, & Bradley, 2007; Yiend, 2012). For instance, two 
recent DPT studies evaluated the impact of “arousal” elicited by positive stimuli (Tamir & 
Robinson, 2007) and reported that only “high arousal” (i.e., rewarding) stimuli were 
preferred after a positive mood induction, while participants did not show an AB to “low-
arousal” (i.e., pleasant) stimuli. 
 
3.5.7 Limitations of response time as measure of selective attention. Most studies 
about selective attention uses paradigms where differences in attention are inferred from RT, 
including the emotional Stroop task (Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996), the dot probe 
task (MacLeod et al., 1996), and the emotional spatial cueing task (Fox, Lester, Russo, 
Bowles, & Dutton, 2011). A recent review noted that RT measures of selective attention are 
cost-effective and widely used (e.g, Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). However doubts have 
also been raised about of how representative RTs are of the general selective attention of an 
individual, considering that each trial represent a single time point. In addition, key press 
responses might be affected by several confounding influences, apart from differences in 
selective attention. Limitations include that the response through key press is likely to be 
influenced by intermediate information processing (occurring between stimulus presentation 
and press) as well as differences in executive ability between subjects (e.g., Armstrong & 
Olatunji, 2012). Alternatives to RT measures include eye-tracking as well as physiological 
markers of biases including fMRI (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). Response biases can be 
avoided or reduced by using neutral response alternatives (i.e., avoiding response labels as 
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plus and minus, or positive and negative), and to present the response target at a time point 
when other stimuli are not present on the screen (Yiend, 2010). 
 
3.6 Typical attentional biases in healthy and psychopathological populations 
 
In this section typical findings regarding attentional biases in healthy (3.5.1) 
and psychopathological (3.5.2) populations are presented. 
 
3.6.1 Attentional biases to emotional stimuli in healthy populations. Although 
results with ABs must be interpreted against the background of the particular paradigms in 
use, a few consistent results pertaining to biased attention to emotional stimuli in healthy 
participants have been found over most paradigms (Yiend, 2010). These include a bias to 
strong threat signals as well as a preference of emotional (positive and negative) versus 
neutral stimuli in general (Yiend, 2010). In addition, emerging research point to increased 
biased attention toward threat stimuli in dangerous situations predicts lower rates of 
psychopathology including both depression and PTSD later on (Bar-Haim, Holoshitz, Eldar, 
Frenkel, Muller, Wald, et al., 2010; Wald, Schchner, Bitton, Holoshitz, Charney, Muller, Bar-
Haim et al., 2011). 
 
3.6.1.1 Threat bias in healthy subjects. Threatening stimuli, such as angry faces, are 
evolutionary salient, and as such are preferred in attentional processes (Ohman & Mineka, 
2001). An angry face in a happy crowd stands out, but a happy face in an angry crowd does 
not (Kahneman, 2012; Ohman & Mineka, 2001). The following thought experiment 
(borrowed from Kahneman, 2012) provides a way of intuitively understanding the 
difference in attentional and cognitive responses related to pleasant and unpleasant stimuli” 
one cockroach in a bowl of strawberries totally cancels the effect of the strawberries, but 
one strawberry in bowl of cockroaches does not cancel the effect of the cockroaches”. 
 
A detected threat stimulus instantly and “automatically” cancels processing of other 
available stimuli and orients the organism toward the threat (McEwen, 2007; Ohman & 
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Mineka, 2001). This rapid orientation to threat is an adaptive response; since a real threat 
might require quick behavioral action (e.g., Ohman & Mineka, 2001). Biases to 
emotionally negative stimuli measured with behavioral tasks generally also found early in 
the attentional process, in particular after presentation times around 100 ms (Yiend, 2010). 
 
3.6.1.2 Avoidance of mild threats in healthy subjects. Although a bias to strong 
threats (i.e., highly unpleasant, evolutionary salient) is found in healthy subjects, avoidance 
to mild threat has also been detected with some consistency in healthy controls using filtering 
and cueing tasks (contrasted with the bias to mild threats found in anxious populations) (e.g., 
Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Yiend, 2010). Thus the intensity of the threat stimuli is of importance 
as a factor that mediates results with such stimuli in both healthy and pathological 
populations (Bar-Haim et al., 2007).  
 
3.6.1.3 Bias to threat stimuli in dangerous situations. Bar-Haim et al. (2010) recently 
investigated people under life-threatening circumstances (i.e., rocket attack) to find out if 
their attention were directed toward or away from threat cues. They found that 
approximation to war-zone increased avoidance of threat cues, with more avoidance of threat 
the closer the danger the measurement was made. Interestingly, higher avoidance of threat 
was associated with higher rates of depression, PTSD and anxiety (higher approximate to the 
danger zone was also related to higher symptoms) (Bar-Haim et al., 2010). Another study 
measured threat bias in soldiers before and 23 weeks after military deployment (i.e., Israeli 
defense force, paratroopers) (Wald et al., 2011). The results showed that higher avoidance of 
threat at baseline predicted higher PTSD symptoms (Wald et al., 2011). These results 
indicate that higher attention to threat (i.e., lower disengagement from threat stimuli in such 
situations) is indicative of resilience later on.  
 
3.6.1.4 Biases to positive stimuli in healthy subjects. A rapid response to positive 
stimuli does not seem to be hardwired in the same way as to threat stimuli (Kahneman, 2012;  
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Troy & Mauss, 2011; Yiend, 2012). However, several AB tasks (including e.g., viewing 
tasks) have found preliminary results showing that all emotional stimuli are preferred to and 
attended more to than neutral stimuli (Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007). That means that 
both positive and negative stimuli engage attention and draws on attentional capacity more 
than neutral stimuli do (Frischen et al., 2007; Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; Yiend, 2010). 
 
Although sufficient research is lacking, preliminary result point to that subjects 
specifically picked out to have low vulnerability to psychopathology (e.g., scoring low on 
anxiety or depression symptomatic, lacking family history of psychopathology, carriers of 
specific protective genes) might show distinct biased attention, including AB to positive 
stimuli (e.g., Frewen et al., 2008; Joorman et al., 2007). Further, studies showing a relation 
between more attention to positive stimuli and positive emotion (Tamir & Robinson, 2007), 
better emotion regulation (Fox et al., 2010) has been found. In addition, indirect evidence 
come from studies training or instructing subjects to focus on positive stimuli, where such 
focus goes together with better emotion regulation (Johnson, 2009; Taylor et al., 2010). A 
complete overview of available studies with positive stimuli in the Dot-Probe task is provided 
in appendix (see appendix 1). Generally, research into protective ABs is lacking and 
important since such research could provide important information about what clinical 
interventions that should be conducted (Yiend, 2010). 
 
3.6.2 Attentional biases in stress-related psychopathology. Psychopathologies, 
such as depression and anxiety, influence all dimensions of individual responding including 
perception, physiological reactions, cognitions and behavior (Cohen, Kessler, & Gordon, 
1997). Several consistent biases have been found in anxiety and depression including an AB 
to threat information in anxious subjects (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Yiend, 2010), and an AB 
to sad stimuli and away from positive stimuli in depressed subjects (Armstrong & Oljatunji, 
2013; Peckham et al., 2010). ABs have been found in other types of disorders, such as pain, 
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eating disorders, and substance abuse and these might also interaction with the experience 
of stressors, however these are beyond the scope of this thesis (but see e.g., Yiend, 2010). 
 
3.6.2.1 Threat bias in anxiety. A robust threat bias has been found in both clinical 
and sub-clinical anxiety (Armstrong & Oljatunji, 2013; Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Yiend, 2010). 
While healthy subjects avoid mild threats in non-stressful situations, anxious subjects react 
stronger to such stimuli (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The bias in anxiety might be a early 
strong evaluation of threats as more intensively threatening than in healthy participants, or it 
might be an attenuation to threat that causes a rapid reactions over sub-cortical pathways 
related to orienting. However, both higher detection and prolonged engagement with threat 
stimuli have been found in anxious subjects, indicating that both higher sensitivity to threats 
and lacking attentional control contribute to the disorder (Yiend, 2010).  
 
3.6.2.2 Bias to sad stimuli in depression. The AB to sad stimuli is most consistent 
after longer presentation times, and thus seem not to be a deficit in detection of negative 
stimuli, but rather an inability to disengage from such stimuli (e.g., Armstrong & Oljabunji, 
2013; Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998; Peckham et al., 2010; Yiend, 2010). Biases are most 
likely to occur for self-relevant sad stimuli (Peckham et al., 2010). A recent meta-analysis 
suggests that more reliable biases are found with presentation times over 1000 ms to sad 
stimuli in depression (Peckham et al., 2010). Subliminal biases, similar to those found to 
threat stimuli in anxiety, were not supported by the meta analysis (Peckham et al., 2010).  
 
Interestingly, depressed subjects have also been found to not show inhibition of return 
(IoR) effects. IoR suppresses attention to an attended location (e.g., the location of a primer) 
somewhere around 300 ms and until around 3000 ms (Posner & Cohen, 1984). IoR is 
commonly thought to prime attention to novelty, by suppressing engagement with a recently 
attended location. Depressed subjects have been found to not show IoR effects for negative 
stimuli (Leyman, De Raedt, Schacht, & Koster, 2007). This finding is in line with research  
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about depression showing that depressed subjects show a deficiency in disrupting 
their attention to negative material (e.g., Yiend, 2010). 
 
3.6.2.1 Bias away from positive stimuli in depression. Attentional biases to positive 
stimuli in depressed subjects are less well researched than biases for negative stimuli (Yiend, 
2010). However, meta analysis results suggest a bias away from positive stimuli in 
depressed subjects as measured with eye-tracking (Armstrong & Oljatunji, 2013). The study 
found that depressed subjects both oriented less to positive stimuli and maintained their gaze 
to such stimuli for shorter times (Armstrong & Oljatunji, 2013). 
 
A few recent studies also suggest that a failure to exhibit enough biased attention to 
positive stimuli might underlie depression (Harmer & Cowen, 2013). Evidence from this line 
of research show that increased attention toward positive stimuli precedes reduction of 
depression symptoms after medication with selective serotonin reuptak inhibitors (SSRIs) 
(Harmer, 2008; Harmer & Cowen, 2013). Such findings indicate a central role for ABs to 
positive stimuli in the etiology of depression (Harmer & Cowen, 2013). 
 
3.7 Attentional control in healthy and psychopathological populations 
 
This section reviews typical finding on attentional control in healthy and populations 
affected by stress related disorder. Findings for attentional and affective control are fused in 
this section, to reflect earlier reporting on control to both neutral and emotional stimuli. 
 
3.7.1 Attentional control in healthy populations. Findings within this field are 
preliminary, however a few general finding can be put forward. These findings are related 
with attentional control rather than affective control proper, but we will still shortly review 
them as they provide important insight. Attentional control is affected by conflict, emotion 
and stress (Goscheke, 2014). As outline in the model section, conflict monitoring strongly 
influences the exhibition of attentional control in healthy subjects (Botvinick et al., 2011; 
Egner, 2007). In addition, recent research show that attentional control is affected by 
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emotions, for instance negative emotions have a task-shielding effect, while positive 
emotions invites to a broadening of attention (Goscheke, 2014). Finally, and most important 
to this thesis, attentional control is affected by both acute and chronic stress. Several studies 
have found that stress induces a stronger likelihood for bottom-up processing in contrast 
with top-down modulation of attention (Goscheke, 2014; Ramos & Arnsten, 2007). In 
addition, stress seems to reduce flexible adaption of attention to the context, such that the 
conflict adaption in such situations is lowered (Gray et al., 2009; Plessow, Fischer, 
Kirschbaum, & Goscheke, 2011a). Findings related more precisely with affective control and 
stress is reviewed further in chapter 4. 
 
3.7.2 Attentional control in stress-related psychopathology. There are two main 
findings related with affective control and stress-related psychopathology; (i) anxiety is 
related with lowered control that affects all instance of threat processing, and (ii) depression 
is related with a decrease in control to negative stimuli that affects elaboration of such 
stimuli. 
 
3.7.2.1 Attentional control in anxiety. Findings with anxious individual show that 
attentional control is dysfunctional in such populations (Bishop, 2009; Etkin et al., 2011). 
This seems to be related with decreased ability in a range of areas, such as emotion 
regulation and inhibition of responses to threat. Within a conflict adaptation framework, it 
has been suggested that impaired emotion regulation in anxious population (related with 
dysfunctions of a dorsal ACC and medial PFC route), together with decreased function of 
top-down regulation of emotion (related with impairment in a ventral-rostral medial PFC 
route) lead to difficulties in fear regulation (Etkin et al., 2011; Goscheke, 2014).  
 
3.7.2.2 Attentional control in depression. Decreased ability to inhibit attention toward 
negative distracting stimuli, in particular to sad self-relevant distracters, is commonly found in 
depressed populations (Gotlib & Joormann, 2010). More precisely, depression seems to go  
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together with a difficulty to disengage from negative internal stimuli (Gotlib & Joormann, 
2010). Interestingly, while healthy controls are characterized by increased recruitment of 
attentional control in the face of conflict and errors, this seem not to be the case in depressed 
individuals (Goscheke, 2014; Menon, 2011; Pizzagalli, 2011). It has therefore been 
suggested that the increased negative affects (related with hyperactivity of ventral PFC and 
limbic areas) together with deficits in deficits in recruitment of affective control (related with 
hypo activity in dorsolateral PFC and ACC) lead to lowered ability to disengage from 
negative internal stimuli (Goscheke, 2014; Pizzagalli, 2011). 
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Chapter 4 – Rationale of this thesis 
 
The prime aim of this thesis was to investigate how individual differences in selective 
attention to emotional stimuli relate to individual differences in resilience. Cognitive-
behavioral stress models suggest that selective attention is as an essential component of 
stress-reactivity (Beck, 1976; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). For instance, the classic stress 
appraisal model suggested by Lazarus and Folkman states that the content of selective 
attention of the individual precedes appraisals of the current situation and available resources 
that in turn results in specific coping mechanisms and behaviors. This stress appraisal model 
states that for a situation to become stressful, it must be perceived as stressful by the 
individual (Monroe & Kelly, 1997). Stimuli that are attended might function as “triggers” and 
elicit further emotions, cognitions and behaviors. Therefore differences in selective attention, 
might lead to totally different perception of a situation. For instance, an enhanced biased 
attention (i.e., representation) of positive stimuli might lead to increased detection of positive 
stimuli with higher positive mood and more reward attainment as possible consequences 
(example adapted from Yiend, 2010, p.5). Thus, differences in selective attention might stand 
in relation with differences in stress responses and resilience (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984; 
Monroe & Kelly, 1997; Todd et al., 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011). In 
other words, individual differences in selective attention, such as differences in biased 
attention to positive stimuli or affective control, might explain why two individuals, 
confronted with the very same stressful event, react to the event in two very different ways. 
 
Several recent theoretical accounts have proposed selective attention can be understood 
as a form of emotion regulation. Such attentional emotion regulation can, if adaptive, lead to 
higher resilience (Todd et al., 2012; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011; Scherer & 
Ceschi, 1997). These accounts are highly relevant, as stressful situations are highly emotional, 
and individual differences in emotion regulation might become amplified 
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in stressful situations (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). Emotions have been defined as 
 
“transient, bio-psycho-social reactions shaped by evolution to aid individuals in adapting 
to and cope with events that have implications for survival and well-being” (Matsumoto & 
 
Ekman, 2010, p. 342). Emotions thus guide us to what is important and helps elicit further 
action related to such stimuli. When we perceive stimuli that are of importance to us, we will 
experience emotion and act on that emotion (Matsumoto & Ekman, 2010). Cognitive 
processes involved in regulation of emotions include (1) increased focus on the emotional 
stimuli and decreased attention to distracters, and (2) emotional response activates memories 
related to situations that are mood-congruent, thus reducing novel behaviors and cognitions 
(Matsumoto & Ekman, 2010). 
 
Attentional deployment as emotion regulation is typically used when the subject 
cannot chose or modifies emotion regulation through change of situation (Werner & Gross, 
2010). Most research in this field has focused on dysfunctional selective attentional 
strategies, including for instance rumination, worry and distractions (Werner & Gross, 2010). 
Rumination involves repetitive evaluation and feelings that are associated with past events, in 
particular negative events (e.g., Morrow & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1990; Werner & Gross, 2010). 
Worry is anticipation of future (negative) events (Werner & Gross, 2010). Increased 
worrying can function as a distracter from strong unpleasant physiological stress, while the 
focus on future threats reduced the attention to the physiological reaction (e.g., Borkovec, 
1994). However, such distraction leads to adverse long-term consequences, as it prevents 
habituation to emotional reactions (Butler & Gross, 2004) and also reduced performance 
(e.g., decision making) in the stressful situation (Metzger, Miller, Cohen, Sofka, & Borkovec, 
1990). Similar to worry, other types of distraction leads to decreases in habituation an well as 
less resources to solve current problems, which may be less adaptive in the long run (Werner 
& Gross, 2010). However, distraction is a common emotion regulatory strategy that might 
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also be positive through regulating mood toward more positivity and prevent rumination or 
worrying (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1993). In contrast, very little is known about adaptive 
selective attentional strategies related with stress resilience. 
 
However, recently several theoretical accounts for how selective attention can be 
protective in stressful situations have been suggested. These accounts can be classified along 
two distinct lines of research. First, it has been suggested that more biased attention to 
positives stimuli regulate the organism toward more positive mood and stronger reward focus 
(Todd et al., 2012). Second, it has been suggested that higher affective control lead to better 
emotion regulation and more flexible conflict adaption that in turn leads to higher resilience 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011). 
 
In the following chapter, these two lines of theory about selective attention to 
emotional stimuli and resilience are outlined, starting with biased attention, followed by 
affective control. Thereafter two main questions for this thesis are formulated, building on 
earlier findings from stress research, and finally, conclusions from the literature, the aims 
and main hypotheses of the presented studies are provided. 
 
4.1 Biased attention as emotion regulation 
 
Affect biased attention has been suggested to play an important role in emotion 
regulation (Todd et al., 2012). Affect biased attention is defined as “attentional biases that 
give rise to preferential perception of a particular category of stimulus based on its relative 
affective salience” (Todd et al., p. 365). As can be seen in figure 6, biased attention is thought 
to be largely un-reflected and characterized by “automaticity
4
” compared with regulation 
taking place further down the cognitive process (e.g., suppression). However, affect-biased 
attention is ongoing, and might take place in anticipation or in reaction to an event, or might 
be related to rapid orienting and later engagement with a stimulus, and might be related to 
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both bottom-up and top-down biases (Todd et al., 2012). As already outlined in chapter 3, 
bottom-up biased attention are related to rapid identification of certain features of stimuli 
(e.g., shape of eyebrows), that in turn releases an immediate heightened attentional state. 
 
Such biased attention is associated with emotion regulation of negative feelings, such as 
anxiety or aggression that are in turn related to avoidance and approach respectively. Top-
down biases, on the other hand, are related with current goals or learned habitual attention 
toward certain stimuli groups in a certain context. However, top-down biases must not be felt 
as effortful in the same way as when, for instance, we direct our attention to specific stimuli 
after conscious consideration (e.g., after instruction to do so). Instead, such effortful biased 
attention might become automatic after many repetitions (Todd et al., 2012). The cause of 
individual differences in affect-biased attention might thus be both differences in bottom-up 
processing as well as differences in learned habitual application of selective attention toward 
stimuli of a certain valence (Todd et al., 2012). 
 
Affect-biased attention is thus understood as attentional pre-tuning to attend to stimuli 
of certain emotional valence in certain context (Todd et al., 2012). Further, affect-biased 
attention guide behavior towards affect congruent actions. It should be noted however, that 
such actions might differ between individuals. For instance biased attention to stressful 
stimuli can elicit both aggression and anxiety depending on individual specific factors. 
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Figure 5. Affect-biased attention as emotion regulatory category 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure adapted from Todd et al. (2012). In the circle: Affect-biased attention is 
defined as pre-event emotion regulation through the activation of representations that tunes 
attention toward stimuli that elicits a specific affect. 
 
4.2 Affective and attentional control as emotion regulation 
 
Ochsner and Gross (2005) have proposed a model of emotion regulation specifically 
pertaining to stress, where attentional control has a central role, the model is visualized in 
figure 7. Attentional control is defined as the ability to selectively attend to different types of 
stimuli in situations, in other words to control the emotional impact of stimuli (Ochsner & 
Gross, 2005). This model assumes that attentional control is closely linked to cognitive 
appraisals (evaluations) of stimuli. There is empirical evidence for such an assumption, for 
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instance attention to positive stimuli has been found to increase positive 
reappraisals (Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999). 
 
In this case attentional control is seen as regulating emotion through early attentional 
selection and more precisely through disengaging from certain emotional information. This is 
therefore a processes taking place before a more elaborate processing. Information that passes 
into elaboration is instead regulated through later cognitive strategies, such as modifying 
appraisals (e.g., Gross, 2007). A common idea related to how attentional control might 
influence emotion regulation is that such regulation involves a relatively low cost-benefit 
tradeoff. Early regulation of emotional material must not engage in the more forceful and 
demanding later modulation of cognition and emotion (Sheppes & Levin, 2013). 
 
Figure. 6. Attentional control impacts stress resilience 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Figure adapted from Troy and Mauss. (2013). This model emphasis the role of 
attentional control, i.e. the ability to direct attention to for instance stimuli of a certain 
emotional valence, and places this type of regulation as preceding cognitive reappraisals. 
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4.3 Main research questions 
 
How can regulation of selective attention to emotional stimuli be related to 
resilience? Based on the reviewed literature and the two main models relating selective 
attention with resilience, we can formulate two main research questions: 
 
(i) Is higher biased attention to positive stimuli related with higher stress resilience?  
 
 
(ii) Is higher affective control, i.e., higher ability to flexibility focus on task-relevant 
emotional stimuli and discharge emotional distracters, related with stress resilience?  
 
These main questions will be answered through investigating available empirical evidence 
 
and through the empirical studies included in this thesis. 
 
4.4 Is higher biased attention to positive stimuli related with higher stress resilience? 
 
The majority of the available theoretical models and empirical evidence about biased 
attention and stress regulation involves biases to negative stimuli (Yiend, 2010). Such studies 
typically find a relationship between higher attention to negative stimuli and more stress-related 
psychopathology (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Peckham et al., 2010). However, as outlined above, it 
has been proposed that more attention to positives stimuli regulates the organism toward more 
positive mood and stronger reward focus and thus toward higher resilience (Todd et al., 2012; 
Yiend, 2010). Such accounts suggest that enhanced representation of positive stimuli might lead 
to increased detection of positive stimuli in the environment with higher positive mood and more 
reward attainment as possible consequences. A few empirical studies support such accounts, 
showing for instance that higher biased attention to positive stimuli is related with low anxiety 
(Frewen et al., 2008) and low vulnerability to depression (Joorman et al., 2007), as well as more 
experience of positive emotion (Ong et al., 2006). Frewen et al. (2008) analyzed 13 studies 
including high- and low anxious participants that all 
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had conducted a cuing task. They found biased attention away from the positive stimuli in the 
anxious group, and a bias toward positive stimuli in the non-anxious group. Frewen and 
colleagues (2008) suggested that individual differences in biased attention might be due to 
higher reinforcement of such stimuli (i.e., higher previous attention to such stimuli), in turn 
leading to stronger neural connections “wired” to such stimuli. Joorman et al. (2007) found 
that girls with a maternal history of depression avoided positive stimuli in a cueing task, 
while girls without such a history instead had a bias toward positive stimuli. 
 
A possible explanation for why more biased attention should predict higher resilience 
is that such attention enable the individual to “bounce back” from stress, by breaking off 
prolonged attention to negative emotions and cognitions that might be prevalent during stress 
(Cohn et al., 2009). Bouncing back has been consistently related with the experience of 
positive emotions (Cohn et al., 2009; Fredrickson, 2013; Tugade & Fredrickson, 2007 and 
biased attention to positive stimuli might be a precursor, or might amplify positive emotions 
and thus function as a “trigger” of positive emotions. 
 
Thus, we can conclude that there is both theoretical and empirical evidence 
suggesting that higher biased attention to positive stimuli is associated with higher resilience. 
However, the evidence is indirect (i.e., relationship between lower biased attention to positive 
stimuli and stress-related psychopathology). In contrast, direct assessment of biased attention 
to positive stimuli together with resilience has not been reported in the available research 
literature. 
 
4.5 Is higher affective control, i.e., higher ability to flexibility focus on task-relevant 
 
emotional stimuli and discharge emotional distracters, related with stress resilience? 
 
Affective control might be strongly related with the ability to flexibly focus to and away 
from threat stimuli. Strong threats stimuli have priority in the attentional processes, as such 
stimuli is evolutionary salient (e.g., LeDoux, 2000). However, dysregulation of attention 
 
67 
 
to threat is related with psychopathology, in particular with anxiety (Bishop, 2009). Anxious 
individuals typically show hyper vigilance to irrelevant threat stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; 
Bishop, 2009). Healthy individuals, on the other hand, avoid mild threats in situations that are not 
dangerous or stressful (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; Yiend, 2010). However, bottom-up processing 
of intensive threat stimuli in non-stressful situations is seen in anxious and healthy subjects alike, 
and such processing is adaptive (Palermo & Rhodes, 2007; Yiend, 2010). Further, recent 
evidence show that strong avoidance of threat before or during a dangerous situation predicts 
lower resilience and more stress-related disorder (PTSD, depression) (Bar-Haim et al., 2010; 
Wald et al., 2011). Based on such findings, we can conclude that the sensitivity and exactness of 
threat detection together with an adaptive ability to discharge irrelevant distracting threat stimuli 
seem to be of importance for stress resilience. 
 
A relationship has also been established between lowered attentional control and 
depression (Goeschke, 2014). Of particular interest is the relationship between failure to 
terminate negative elaboration (i.e., prolonged engagement with internal negative stimuli) 
and lowered attentional control (Goeschke, 2014). It has been found that depressed subject 
fail to recruit attentional control in response to conflict contributes. The failure has been 
suggested to contribute to the often-found failure to disengage from negative stimuli in 
depression (Goeschke, 2014). Several studies have found that attentional control mediates 
the relationship between rumination and stress. For instance, a recent study found that 
impaired control (i.e., larger switching costs in a switching task) mediated the relationship 
between stress and rumination six weeks later (De Lissnyder, Koster, Goubert, ONrraedt, 
Vanderhasselt, & DeRaedt, 2012). This finding is in line with other studies finding an 
association between lower attentional control and an increase in rumination and intrusions 
(Haagenar & Putman, 2010). 
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A few recent studies have investigated how stress affects attentional control (Gray et 
al., 2009; Plessow et al., 2011a; Plessow et al., 2011b). These studies have found a decrease 
in attentional control in response to both acute (Plessow et al., 2011a; Plessow, Kiesler, & 
Kirschbaum, 2011b) and chronic stress (Gray et al., 2009). Plessow et al. (2011a, 2011b) 
found that attentional control (measured with a switching task) was decreased following a 
standardized psychosocial stressor (i.e., the Trier Social Stress Test) compared with 
participants that had not undergone any stressor. Gray and colleagues (2009) measured 
attentional control (with a switching task) during a period of chronic stress. Control was 
positively correlated with perceived stress in this study, and the decrease was reversed after 
termination of the stressor (Gray et al., 2009). 
 
In addition, one study investigated how affective flexibility (measured with a 
flexibility task) is related with trait resilience (Genet & Siemer, 2011). In this study, the 
participants conducted several behavioral tasks measuring attentional and affective 
flexibility, as well as working memory capacity together with a self-rate measurement of trait 
resilience. The result showed that attentional and affective control were unique predictors of 
trait resilience (Genet & Siemer, 2011). 
 
4.4 Conclusions and hypotheses 
 
 
As discussed above, both theoretical accounts and empirical evidence suggest that 
differences in selective attention to emotional stimuli might influence individual differences 
in resilience. Possible pathways of resilience are directed both over the magnitude of 
attention to positive (and negative) stimuli, and over individual differences in affective 
control. It is by now well known that stress-related disorders, such as anxiety and depression, 
are related to increased attention to negative stimuli (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Peckham et 
al., 2010) and to lower affective control (e.g., Goeschke, 2014). In contrast, less is known 
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about adaptive selective attention in relation with stress resilience. Further, research 
investigating selective attention to emotional stimuli in healthy and highly resilient subjects 
has been put forward as a priority, as evidence from such research is needed to guide 
clinical prevention and treatment (Yiend, 2010). 
 
The main aims of the thesis were formulated as follows: 
 
 
(i) Investigating how biased attention to emotional (positive, negative) stimuli is related with 
trait stress resilience  
 
(ii) Investigating how affective control is related with (i) trait resilience and, (ii) 
emotional responses to a laboratory stressor.  
 
 
 
The main hypotheses were 
 
(i) Higher biased attention to positive stimuli is associated with higher resilience.  
 
 
(ii) Higher affective control is related with (a) higher trait resilience, and (b) 
more adaptive emotion reactivity to a laboratory stressor  
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Chapter 5 – Empirical studies 
 
In the following chapter, the two original works included in this thesis are presented. 
The original work comprises results from three experimental studies structured in two 
articles. The introduction, method, results and discussion of the two articles are presented 
below. 
 
5.1 Abstracts  
 
5.1.1 Attentional bias toward positive stimuli predicts stress resilience. There is 
extensive evidence for an association between an attentional bias (AB) toward emotionally 
negative stimuli and vulnerability to stress-related psychopathology. Less is known about 
whether mental health and stress resilience may also relate to selective attention toward 
emotionally positive stimuli. The current study used a modified Dot Probe task to investigate 
if individual differences in AB toward either happy or angry emotional stimuli are related to 
self-reported stress resilience. In a nonclinical sample (N=43), we indexed AB as individual 
differences in reaction time for stimuli preceded by either happy or angry (compared to 
neutral) face stimuli. Participants with greater AB toward happy, but not angry faces reported 
higher resilience. An AB towards angry stimuli moderated this effect: The AB toward happy 
faces was only predictive in those individuals who also endorsed an AB towards angry 
stimuli. This finding suggests that (1) an AB toward positive emotional stimuli may be a 
protective factor contributing to stress resilience, specifically in those individuals also 
endorsing an AB to negative emotional stimuli and, (2) that such an attentional bias may 
offer a novel target for prevention and treatment interventions addressing stress-related 
psychopathology.  
 
Keywords: attentional bias, resilience, positive, emotion, dot probe task 
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 5.1.2 Affective control predicts stress resilience and emotional reactivity to a 
 
laboratory stressor The ability to focus on task- relevant emotional stimuli and disregard 
emotional distracters, so called affective control, has been suggested to amplify emotion 
regulation during stress. During stress exposure, higher affective control may increase the 
 
capacity to attend to an.d pursue a task at hand. In two studies, we investigated whether 
individual differences in affective control, indexed by a modified Stroop task, predicts (i) trait 
stress resilience and (ii) emotional reactivity to a laboratory stressor. As hypothesized, greater 
affective control predicted higher trait stress resilience (b=.27, p= .041), and more adaptive 
emotional reactivity in response to a laboratory stressor, i.e., decline in positive mood (b=- 
 
.22, p= .029) and affective reactivity (b=.20, p= .017) in response to a standardized laboratory 
stressor. These results show that greater affective control is related to increased self-reported 
stress resilience, as well as more adaptive emotional reactivity to a laboratory stressor. Our 
findings suggest one possible pathway to resilience, with higher affective control leading to 
better emotional reactivity to stressors. These results might contribute to the development of 
prevention and treatment options for stress related disorder. 
 
Keywords: Affective control, conflict adaptation, emotion, resilience, Stroop task 
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5.2 Attentional bias toward positive emotion predicts stress resilience  
 
 
5.2.1 Introduction. Prior studies consistently show an association between an attentional 
bias (AB) to threatening stimuli and the development and maintenance of anxiety (Bar-Haim et 
al, 2007; Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008). Selective attention to positive material 
has received considerably less attention. This is somewhat surprising, as it is known that an AB 
toward positive stimuli may facilitate adaptive stress regulation by preventing negative 
emotional responses to stressors and increase reward direction (e.g., Dandeneau, Baldwin, 
Baccus, Sakellaropoulo, & Pruessner, 2007). An AB towards positive information may therefore 
play an important role in determining mental health and stress resilience, i.e. adaptive 
psychological and physiological responding to stressors (e.g., Feder, Nestler, & Charney, 2009).  
 
Initial studies suggest that an AB to positive stimuli is related to the absence of 
psychopathology. Frewen and colleagues reviewed 14 studies investigating AB toward reward-
relevant stimuli and concluded that an AB toward positive stimuli was associated with low 
anxiety (Frewen et al., 2008). Several recent studies have confirmed the association between AB 
toward positive stimuli and absence of psychopathology (Peckham et al, 2010; Mingtian, Jinyao, 
Shugiao, & Atchley, 2011; Taylor, Bomyea, & Amir, 2010) as well as low vulnerability to 
depression (Joormann et al., 2007).  
 
A handful of studies have specifically investigated AB toward positive stimuli in the context 
of stress adaptation. In one study, AB toward positive stimuli predicted less subjective stress to a 
laboratory stressor four months later (Fox, Cahill, & Zougkou, 2010). Participants with higher AB 
toward positive stimuli have also been shown to show mitigated stress responses and to endure 
longer on a stressful anagram task (Johnson, 2009). Interestingly, an AB away from negative stimuli 
also predicted reduced stress in response to both laboratory (Fox et al., 2010) and naturalistic 
stressors (Fox et al., 2010; MacLeod & Hagan, 1992; Osinsky, Lösch, Hennig, Alexander, & 
MacLeod, 2012). Taken together, these studies suggest that an AB toward  
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positive, and possibly away from negative stimuli, predicts stress resilience. However, these 
prior studies indexed stress coping as a reduction in negative emotions or the absence of 
depression and anxiety and did not specifically assess stress resilience. Moreover, most 
studies investigate separate influences of AB toward positive and negative stimuli on stress 
coping, without taking into account the possibility that the biases may interact, such that an 
AB toward negative stimuli may modulate the effect of an AB toward positive stimuli. 
 
The present study indexed AB with the frequently used Dot Probe Task (DPT; MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). A stimulus pair, typically one emotional and one neutral stimulus, is 
presented simultaneously in two separate locations. This followed by a target in one of the two 
locations, and the participants have to classify this stimulus as fast as possible. If the emotional 
stimulus is selectively attended, participants respond faster to the probe at the location of the 
emotional stimulus compared to the neutral stimulus, resulting in an AB. Target detection is 
generally held easy in the DPT, with typical error rates around one percent (e.g., Mogg et al., 1997). 
This may lead to individual differences in how difficult the task is for participants due to ceiling 
effects. In order to increase task sensitivity, we therefore created a modified version of the DPT that 
included a pre-DPT adjustment of individual difficulty level of probe detection. 
 
The main aim of the present study was to investigate the association between AB toward 
emotionally positive and negative facial stimuli and individual differences in stress resilience. 
We hypothesized that (i) an AB toward positive face stimuli would predict greater stress 
resilience. We also explored whether (ii) an AB away from negative face stimuli would predict 
stress resilience and (iii) whether an AB toward negative stimuli moderates the association 
between AB toward positive stimuli and resilience. Understanding factors that promote 
resilience in the face of stress is crucial for the development of stress prevention programs and 
for improving treatment of stress-related disorders. 
 
5.2.2 Method. 
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5.2.2.1 Participants. Forty-three (11 male, 32 female) healthy adults participated in 
exchange for 25 Swiss Francs (27 US$ at time of testing). All participants were right-handed 
and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. The mean age of participants was 27 years (SD = 
6.50). The local ethic board approved the study and all participants gave their informed consent.  
 
5.2.2.2 Measures.  
 
5.2.2.2.1 Self-reported stress resilience. Stress resilience was measured with the German 
version of the Resilience Scale (RS-11; Wagnild & Young, 1993; Schumacher, Leppert, 
Gunzelmann, Strauss, & Brähler, 2005). The RS-11 comprises 11 items ranging from 1-7, and 
answers are added up to a sum score indexing trait resilience, with higher scores reflecting 
greater trait resilience. The RS-11 has high internal consistency (Cronbach α= .91), and has 
shown convergent validity with related constructs. Internal consistency was high in the present 
sample, α= .84.  
 
5.2.2.2.2 Modified Dot Probe Task. The experimental task was a modified DPT (McLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986), see Figure 1A-B. Each trial included (1) the presentation of a central 
fixation point that was constantly shown on the screen, (2) a 200 ms presentation of a face pair 
consisting of an emotional (i.e., happy or angry) and a neutral face, followed by (3) a 200 ms 
presentation of a pair of Landolt ring stimuli (Schrauf & Stern, 2001). One of these Landolt stimuli 
contained an opening in the upper or lower part of the ring, the other stimulus did not contain any 
opening. Participants were instructed to indicate as fast and accurately as possible if the Landolt 
opening was located up or down by pressing one out of two response keys. Before the actual 
experimental task, the difficulty level was individually adjusted for each participant
1
. The 
thresholding procedure was identical to the experimental paradigm safe for three aspects: (1) the 
angle of the Landolt opening was varied, (2) the stimulus pairs included different NIMSTIM faces 
(Tottenham, Tanaka, Leon, McCarry, Nurse, & Hare, et al., 2009), and  
 
(3) the procedure was terminated as soon as enough responses had been given to determine the  
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individual Landolt angle resulting in 80% correct responses for this participant (M = 9.33°, SD = 
5.91°). This calculated angle was used in the two sessions of the experimental paradigm. No 
feedback about response correctness was given after each trial. The experiment (excluding the 
threshold task) consisted of two sessions of 192 trials each. Each session lasted approximately 
 
10 minutes.  
 
5.2.2.2.3 Stimuli and apparatus. The face and target stimuli were presented on a 
computer monitor (36.5 cm wide and 27.5 cm high) using a Windows PC computer and Cogent 
2000 ( http://visilab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_2000.php) running in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, 
MA, USA). All stimuli were viewed from a 76.5 cm distance, and subtended 3.75° visual angle. 
The emotional stimuli consisted of 32 (i.e., happy, angry, neutral) face stimuli from the 
NIMSTIM set (Tottenham et al., 2009). The two Landolt rings were presented at the locations of 
the face stimuli (see Figure 1B). All stimuli were randomized and counterbalanced; and each 
face appeared in all emotional conditions. We tracked fixation during the experimental paradigm 
with an eye-tracker (Eyelink1000, SR research, Arlington, USA) and all participants fixated 
well during the experiment.  
 
5.2.2.3 Procedure. Testing took place during the hours of 9am and 6pm in the 
Laboratory for Social and Neural Systems Research (SNS-Lab) at the University of Zurich. 
Upon arrival, participants were instructed about the experiment and filled out an informed 
consent form. They completed the questionnaire measures prior to the laboratory session. 
Before starting the experiment, the chin rest and eye-tracker were adjusted and calibrated. After 
completion of the experimental task, participants were debriefed and received payment. 
 
5.2.2.4. Data analysis. Two participants did not complete questionnaires due to language 
difficulties and were removed from the analysis. All dot probe data were analyzed following 
standard procedures (e.g., Mingtian et al., 2011): Trials with response times shorter than 200 ms (29 
trials; < 1 %) and longer than 1200 ms (760 trials; 4.5 %) were removed (789 trials; 5.5 %). 
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AB scores were created by subtracting individual mean reaction time in congruent (i.e., probe 
behind emotional stimulus) from incongruent (i.e., probe behind neutral stimulus) trials. When 
responses are faster in congruent compared to incongruent trials, the AB score will be 
positive, indicating attention toward the congruent stimuli. 
 
Reaction time (RT) differences between emotional and congruent/incongruent 
conditions were analyzed with a two-factorial ANOVA followed by paired t-tests. To predict 
self-reported trait resilience, we correlated individual AB with resilience scores and calculated a 
linear robust regression analysis in two steps, regressing the resilience score (RS-11) on both 
AB scores (positive and negative) in the first step, and adding the interaction between the two 
AB scores in the second step. In case of a significant interaction effect, we also conducted 
simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). Statistical analyses were computed using Stata 12 
(StataCorp, 2011). 
 
5.2.3 Results. 
 
5.2.3.1 Descriptive group results. In a 2 x 2-factorial repeated measures ANOVA with the 
factors emotion (happy, angry) and congruency (congruent, incongruent), we found no main 
effects of emotion, F(3, 42)= 0.42, p= .521, or congruency, F(3, 42)= 0.42, p= .420, but a 
significant interaction between emotion and congruency, F(3, 42)= 6.11 p= .018. Follow up 
t-tests showed that responses to congruent happy (probe after happy face; M= 742 ms, SD= 
 
177 ms) were significantly slower than to incongruent happy trials (probe after neutral face; 
 
M= 734 ms, SD= 169 ms), t(42) = 2.50, p= .017. Congruent, M= 737 ms, SD= 172 ms, 
and incongruent, M= 741 ms, SD= 175 ms, angry trials were not significantly different, 
t(42)= 1.60, p= .116. 
 
Happy and angry AB scores were significantly different, t(42) = 2.48, p = .017 (Happy: 
 
M= - 8.35, SD = 21.80, range: -66.10 - 32.28; Angry: M= 5.76, SD= 23.47, range: -38.94 - 
 
69.17), see Figure 1C. Importantly, there was considerable individual variability in AB scores, as 
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necessary for the analysis of individual differences. Mean trait resilience in our sample 
was high, M= 60.88, SD= 9.14, range: 38 – 72. 
 
5.2.3.2 Attentional Biases and Stress Resilience. As hypothesized, greater AB to happy, 
but not angry, faces was positively correlated with higher trait resilience, see Figure 1D-E. The first 
step of the robust regression showed that AB to happy faces significantly predicted higher trait 
resilience, b = .39, t(38) = 2.61 p = .013, while AB to angry faces b = -.01, t(38) = -0.10, p 
 
= .923 did not predict resilience, overall model: R
2
 = .15, F(2, 38) = 3.57, p = .038. When the 
interaction between AB toward happy and angry face stimuli was included into the model in 
step 2, neither AB to happy, b = .22, t(37) = 1.40, p= .169, nor AB to angry faces, b = .12, t(37) 
= 0.95, p = .347 alone predicted resilience, but the interaction between AB to happy and angry 
stimuli was significant, b = .38, t(37) = 3.28 p = .002. The overall model was also significant in 
the second step of the regression, R
2
 = .24, F(2, 37) = 15.53, p < .001. To follow up the 
interaction, we regressed AB for happy stimuli on resilience in subgroups of high and low AB 
toward angry stimuli. As depicted in Figure 2, AB to happy stimuli predicted resilience in those 
with high AB to angry stimuli (B = 0.19, t= 2.86, p =.007), but not in those with low AB to 
angry stimuli, (B = -0.01, t = -0.02, p = .985). 
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Figure. 7. Modified Dot-Probe Task (A-B), Mean AB scores (C) and Pearson Correlations between AB Scores and Resilience (D-E) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure. 1. A-B: Schematic structure of each trial of the dot probe task; C: Mean AB for happy and angry trials; D-E: Relationship between AB 
scores and stress resilience. AB-RT= reaction time-based attentional bias score, Resilience score= mean resilience score indexed with the 
Resilience Scale (Schumacher et al., 2005). 
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Figure. 8. Simple Slope Analyses Explaining Interaction Between AB Scores in 
Predicting Resilience 
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Figure 2. Low AB toward angry stimuli (dashed line) represents values 1 SD of below the 
mean, high AB toward angry stimuli (continuous line) represents values of 1 SD above the 
mean. 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2.4 Discussion. The central aim of this study was to test whether an AB towards 
positive emotional material predicts resilience using a modified DPT. We hypothesized that 
AB toward happy, and possibly an AB away from angry face stimuli, would predict resilience 
and explored whether the two biases interact. In line with our hypothesis, we found that an AB 
toward happy, but not away from angry, face stimuli predicted greater self-reported stress 
resilience. An AB toward angry stimuli moderated this effect. These results provide 
preliminary evidence for a specific relationship between stress resilience and an AB toward 
happy face stimuli that is modulated by AB toward angry stimuli. 
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Overall, we found an effect for emotional valence as the group showed higher AB 
toward neutral and angry compared to happy faces. This is in accord with prior studies and the 
assumption that such an AB to positive stimuli is unlikely to overrule AB to negative or neutral 
stimuli in magnitude in healthy participants (e.g., Eldar & Bar-Haim, 2010). Negative material 
may generally have a stronger attentional draw than positive material (Fox et al., 2000). 
Importantly, however, we found considerable inter-individual variation in the extent to which 
participants’ attention was drawn toward positive stimuli and thus in the magnitude in which 
an AB toward positive stimuli was expressed. 
 
A first key finding was that individuals with higher AB toward positive stimuli reported 
greater resilience. This result extends earlier findings showing that AB toward positive stimuli is 
not only related to adaptive stress responses and less stress-related psychopathology (Johnson, 
2009; Fox et al., 2012; Frewen et al., 2008; Joorman et al., 2007), but that it may promote 
stress-resilience. We found that the association was specific to an AB towards positive stimuli 
in our study, as there was no effect of an AB toward or away from negative stimuli on stress 
resilience. An AB toward positive stimuli may thus constitute a form of emotion regulation and 
thereby influence vulnerability to stress and psychopathology via the experience of positive 
emotion (Gross, 1998; Todd, Cunningham, Anderson, & Thompson, 2012). There is direct 
support for this assumption by experimental studies suggesting that AB toward positive stimuli 
is indeed related to positive mood (Tamir & Robinson, 2007). Frewen and colleagues (2008) put 
forward the explanation that individual differences in exposure to positive stimuli may lead to 
subsequent differences in the magnitude to which AB toward positive stimuli are expressed, 
with more exposure leading to more pronounced biases. AB training studies are in accord with 
this assumption, as participants trained to attend to positive stimuli reported lowered levels of 
post-training stress (Dandeneau et al., 2007) and stress related pathology (Li, Tan, Qian, & Liu, 
2008). Individual differences exist in the extent to which an AB toward positive stimuli can be 
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trained, however, and mitigated stress responses have been found only in those participants who 
indeed acquired an AB toward positive stimuli in such training studies (Johnson, 2009; Taylor 
et al., 2010). 
 
A second key finding of our study was that an AB toward negative stimuli moderated the 
effect of an AB toward positive stimuli on resilience, in that an AB toward positive stimuli was 
predictive of resilience in those individuals who also endorsed an AB toward negative stimuli. There 
are two possible explanations for this finding. First, only for those endorsing a tendency to be 
sensitive to negative stimuli might an AB toward positive stimuli be an effective and necessary 
means of promoting resilience, whilst those without the bias towards negative material are less in 
need of this potentially protective process. Second, an AB toward threat has been shown to be 
protective in some groups (e.g., Bar-Haim et al. 2010; Wald et al. 2011), and it is conceivable that 
such a bias, in combination with a bias toward positive material, potentiates processes related to 
stress-resilience. More complex attentional mechanisms may be present in resilient individuals, and 
it is conceivable that the two interacting biases operate at different temporal lags (see also Onmis, 
Dadds & Bryant, 2011). Resilient individuals may initially orient and attend to threat and negative 
stimuli, but then attend to the processing of positive stimuli, which may serve as an adaptive and 
protective mechanism. The finding that some individuals do seem to be more prone to develop 
biases to both positive and negative material (Fox, Zougkou, Ridgewell, & Garner, 2011) further 
supports our finding of a mutual relationship between the biases. Further research will be necessary 
to disentangle possible mechanisms, including possible timelags at which these ABs operate, but our 
finding suggests that an AB toward positive stimuli may be protective, i.e., related to resilience, 
specifically in those individuals with a coexisting tendency to show automatic attentional responses 
to negative stimuli. 
 
The current study is not without limitations. First, we used self-report questionnaires to 
measure trait resilience although multiple assessments of physiological and psychological 
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functioning in naturalistic situations might be more reliable indices (Bonnanno et al., 2011). 
Second, the present sample comprised healthy control participants that were rather 
homogenous in trait resilience resulting in a possible ceiling effect. Third, our modified DPT 
indexed included a pre-threshold task to adjust the difficulty level for all participants, which 
may make our results less comparable with other DPT studies that exclude pre-adjustment. 
Fourth, we assessed attentional biases in the absence of threat or stressors. Indexing the same 
processes under conditions of stress might have rendered different results and should be 
investigated by future studies. 
 
Taken together, our results show that increased attention to positive emotional stimuli 
predicts trait resilience and that this effect was specific to those individuals who endorse an AB 
to negative emotional stimuli. While we found an overall preference for processing neutral and 
angry above happy faces, individual differences in AB toward positive stimuli were predictive 
of trait resilience in our study. An AB toward positive stimuli may thus not constitute a 
 
“default” state endorsed by all individuals alike, but individual differences in such an AB are 
associated with enhanced ability to adapt to stressful situations. Further, our results suggest that 
AB toward positive and negative stimuli interact in influencing resilience, with an AB to 
positive stimuli being protective when an AB to negative stimuli is also present. These findings 
have important implications for the development of stress prevention programs and for 
improving treatment of stress-related disorders. Manipulating types of stimuli individuals attend 
to may help decrease vulnerability to stress-related psychopathology and increase resilience. 
Our results suggest that increasing the tendency to attend to emotionally positive stimuli could 
render individuals, specifically those who are also sensitive to negative emotional stimuli, more 
resilient. 
 
5.3 Affective control predicts stress resilience and emotional reactivity to a laboratory 
 
stressor 
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5.3.1 Introduction. The ability to flexibly focus on task-relevant emotional stimuli 
and disregard emotional distracters, so called affective control, has been suggested to mediate 
emotion regulation to stressful events leading to individual differences in stress resilience 
(Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011). Stimuli that are selectively attended to in 
stressful situations might elicit further reactions, such as cognitive appraisals, emotions and 
behavior, and attentional processes may thus modulate further stress reactions (Lazarus & 
Folkman 1984; Monroe & Kelly, 1997; Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011). Some 
studies have indeed suggested that attentional control to neutral stimuli is related to decreased 
stress responses (Genet & Siemer, 2011; Liston, McEwen, & Casey, 2009). Liston at al. 
(2009) showed that chronic stress is associated with decline in attentional control measured 
with a switching task, and that the decline is reversed after termination of the stress (Liston et 
al., 2009). In contrast to these studies on neutral stimuli, the relationship between affective 
control, i.e. attentional control to emotional stimuli, and adaptive responses to stress and 
stress resilience is not well understood. One recent study reported that both affective and non-
affective attentional flexibility were unique predictors of trait resilience (Genet & Siemer, 
2011). However, this study used an affective flexibility task that does not directly assess 
affective control. The current study builds on these initial results and investigated whether 
higher affective control predicted trait resilience and emotional reactivity to a laboratory 
stressor. 
 
Emotional stimuli are typically processed differently from neutral stimuli in the 
attentional process, as emotional information may be preferentially processed and might 
therefore interfere with processing of other types of stimuli (e.g., Ohman, Flykt, & Esteves, 
2001; LeDoux, 2000). The interference by emotional stimuli is often adaptive, since such 
stimuli may carry important information about significant reward and threats (Reeck, LaBar, 
& Egner, 2012). However, if the individual cannot direct attention away from irrelevant 
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emotional distracters, interference of emotional stimuli can be detrimental and lowered 
affective control has been linked to decreased ability to disengage from both distracting 
rewards and threats (Osseward, Qin, Van Marle, van Wingen, Fernandez, & Hermans, 
2010). Recent evidence from imaging studies show that different neural routes are involved 
in regulating attentional control to emotional and neutral stimuli, with the rostral anterior 
cingulate inhibiting amygdale responses to irrelevant emotional stimuli, while a lateral 
prefrontal route is involved in regulating responses to distracting neutral stimuli (e.g., Egner, 
2007; Etkin, Egner, & Kalisch, 2011). 
 
Affective control, i.e. attentional control to such emotional stimuli, might be of 
particular importance in stressful situations because such situations are highly emotional 
(Sarason, Johson, & Siegel, 1978). Attentional control decreases in stressful situations, 
resulting in for instance a lowered ability for task switching in such situations (Liston et al., 
2009; Plessow, Kirschbaum, & Goschke, 2011). Stress-related decreases in attentional 
control might also contribute to increased avoidance of relevant threat cues (Bar-Haim, 
Holoshitz, Eldar, Frenkel, Muller, et al., 2010). A few recent findings, using a dot-probe task 
assessing biased attention, indicate that preserved focus on both relevant threat and rewards 
in stressful situations is related to stress resilience (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Wald, 
Shechner, Bitton, Holoshitz, Bar-Haim, et al., 2011; Vythilingham, Nelson, Scaramozza, 
Waldeck, Haylett, Soutwick et al., 2008). Moreover, studies indexing self-reported 
attentional control have linked decreased attentional control with non-adaptive coping, as for 
instance over-eating (Miller & Cohen, 2001; Osseward et al., 2010) and also with inability to 
disengage from internal negative stimuli such as in increased worry and intrusions (e.g., 
Hagenaars & Putman, 2011; Verwored, de Jong, & Wessel, 2008). Preserved attentional 
control in stressful situations, on the other hand, might be characteristic for resilient 
individuals (Charney & Southwick, 2010). These individuals endorse the ability to flexibly 
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adapt to change and “bounce back” from adverse life experiences, including experience 
ranging from everyday problems to traumatic events (e.g., Ong, Bergeman, Bsiconti, & 
Wallance, 2006). According to Charney and Southwick (2010), resilient individual might 
be more likely to preserve focus on relevant stimuli in stressful situations and might use 
affective control to regulate their emotional response (Ochsner & Gross, 2005; Troy & 
Mauss, 2011). 
 
The degree of exhibited attentional control depends on the level of conflict in the 
situational context (Botvinick, Braver, Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001), Congruency tasks, 
provide variations in conflict as proxies of such situational conflicts and have been suggested as 
reliable measures of e attentional control (e.g., Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1992; Egner, 
2007). The Stroop task is a congruency task where the presentation of incongruent (i.e., 
conflicting facial and word) stimuli induces conflict (e.g., Egner, 2007; Monti, Weintraub, & 
Egner, 2010). Findings with Stroop tasks typically show increased interference reduction by 
distracters in trials following incongruent trials (Botvinick et al., 2001; Carter, Macdonald, 
Botvinick, Ross, Stenger, Noll, & Cohen, 2001; Etkin, Egner, Peraza, Kandel, & Hirsch, 2006; 
Logan & Zbrodoff, 1979; Monti et al., 2010). These so called congruency sequence-effects have 
been put forth as a direct measure of regulation of attentional control in response to conflict 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 2007; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1992). From this perspective, 
attentional control involves both detection of conflict and ongoing adjustment to the level of 
conflict (Botvinick et al., 2001; Monti et al., 2010). 
 
In the current study, we measured affective control (i.e., conflict adaptation to 
emotional stimuli) with a modified emotional Stroop task (e.g., Etkin et al., 2006; Monti et 
al., 2010). Conflict adaptation scores reflect the interaction between the previous and current 
trial on performance, with higher values reflecting higher affective control (Etkin et al., 2006; 
Monti et al., 2010). Conflict adaptation scores acknowledge that the typical findings from 
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current trail congruency (i.e., slower responses to incongruent stimuli) are modified by 
the congruency in the previous trial. Typically, the congruency effect on the current trials 
is mitigated by a previous incongruent trial, reflecting higher exhibition following conflict 
(Gratton et al., 1992; Egner, 2007; Monti et al., 2010). 
 
Taken together, recent theory and empirical studies suggest that affective control 
constitutes an important aspect of resilience by mediating emotional responses in stressful 
situations (Gross & Ochsner, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011). However, the nature of attentional 
control has previously often been measured with self-report assessments (e.g., Hagenaars & 
Putman, 2011; Verwoered, et al., 2008). The present studies expand on these results and 
indexed affective control with a behavioral task (Egner, 2007). We assessed affective control 
in the context of a cross-sectional study using self-report questionnaires of trait resilience. 
Moreover, we examined the association between attentional control and emotional reactivity 
to a laboratory stressor. The main aims of the current study were twofold, to investigate 
whether affective control was associated with (i) self-reported trait resilience, and (ii) 
emotional responses to a laboratory stressor, i.e., less decrease in positive mood, as well as 
less distress in response to the laboratory stressor. Such results would be in line with 
theoretical suggestions that higher affective control predicts better emotion regulation leading 
to stress resilience (Gross & Ochsner, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011).. 
 
5.3.1.1 The present studies. The behavioral task used in the current studies has been 
established as a measure of affective control and conflict adaptation (e.g., Etkin et al., 2006; 
Monti et al., 2010). The experimental task used in both studies included the presentation of 
emotional face stimuli with an overlaid emotional word, and participants had to indicate the 
emotional expression of the face (e.g., fearful, happy). The word can be either congruent or 
incongruent with the facial expression. Trials are shown successively, with each trial 
following either a congruent or incongruent previous trial. Response time in trials following 
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an incongruent trial is typically shorter, reflecting higher affective control and better 
conflict adaptation (e,g., Monti et al., 2010). 
 
Study 1 
 
In the first study, we investigated the association between affective control and self-
reported trait stress resilience. 
 
5.3.2 Method. 
 
5.3.2.1 Participants. Forty-eight healthy students (mean age 26.15 years, SD= 5.75; 
32 (65.31%) women, 17 (34.69%) men) participated against a monetary compensation of 25 
CHF (27 USD). Participants were screened for previous or current psychiatric illness. All 
participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. They gave informed consent and the 
local ethic board approved the study.  
 
5.3.2.2 Measures.  
 
5.3.2.2.1 Affective control task. The experimental task, i.e. a modified emotional 
Stroop task, has been used extensively to measure conflict adaptation (Etkin et al., 2006; 
Monti et al., 2010). As shown in figure 1, each trial included (1) the presentation of a central 
fixation cross for 1000 ms, (2) the presentation of an emotional face (i.e., happy or sad) with 
an overlaid emotional word (i.e., happy or sad) for 1000 ms, and (3) an intermediate trial 
period of 3000 ms. Participants were asked to indicate whether the facial expression of the 
stimuli was happy or fearful, and thus had to disregard the emotional word, and to respond by 
pressing a key as fast and accurate as possible. After a short practice, participants completed 
100 trials (50 congruent, 50 incongruent). The task session lasted for around 9 minutes. 
Similarly as in other studies using the experimental task (see e.g., Reeck et al., 2012), the 
semantic meaning of the words that are laid over the face stimuli can be either congruent or 
incongruent with the facial expression of the face stimuli. In the current study, the congruent 
conditions consisted of either happy face- happy word or fearful face- fear word, and the 
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incongruent conditions consisted of happy face – fear word, or fearful face – happy 
word. Stimuli presentation was randomized and counterbalanced between participants. 
 
Figure 9. Stimuli and Schematic Trial of the Emotional Stroop task used in both Studies 
 
 
A 
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B 
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Figure. 1. A: Example stimuli in different emotional conditions; a) incongruent happy 
stimuli, b) incongruent fear stimuli, c) congruent fear stimuli, d) congruent happy stimuli; 
B: Schematic trial. 
 
 
 
 
Following Etkin et al. (2006), we constructed individual RT scores by creating a mean 
sum score for congruent trials following congruent trials (CC), incongruent trials following 
congruent trials (CI), incongruent trials following incongruent trials (II) and congruent trails 
following incongruent trails (IC). Table 1 show means and SDs of RT scores. We then 
constructed individual conflict adaptation scores using the following formula [(CI-CC) – (II- 
 
CI)]. Conflict adaptation scores reflect the interaction between previous and current trial on the 
performance, with higher values reflecting better conflict adaptation (Monti et al., 2010). 
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Black- and white face stimuli from the Ekman set of facial expressions were used as 
stimuli (Ekman & Friesen, 1976), depicting eight female and six male individuals showing happy 
or fearful expressions with either open or closed mouth. Emotional words, either “happy” or 
“fear”, were laid over the face stimuli in a central position, resulting in two conditions; emotional 
face (happy, fearful) x word stimuli (happy, fear). The stimuli were presented on a computer 
monitor (36.5 cm wide and 27.5 cm high) using a Windows PC computer and Cogent 2000  
(http://visilab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_2000.php) running in MATLAB (MathWorks, Natick, MA, 
USA). A chin rest was used to ensure a distance from the screen of 
 
76.5 cm  
 
 
5.3.2.2.1 Self-reported stress resilience. The Resilience Scale (RS-11; Wagnild & 
Young, 1993) was used to index trait stress resilience. The RS-11 measures resilience as a 
personality trait and includes items covering ratings of personal competence (e.g., self 
confidence, independence) and acceptance of self and life (e.g., flexibility, tolerance). Each 
of the items is answered using a scale ranging from 1 (“No, I don’t agree“) to 7 (“Yes, I 
totally agree”). A sum score ranging from 11 to 77 is obtained by adding up the 11 items. The 
RS-11 has high internal consistency, Cronbach α= .91 (Wagnild & Young, 1993), in the 
present sample Cronbach α= .80.  
 
5.3.2.3 Procedure. The experiment took place in the Laboratory for Social and Neural 
Systems Research (SNS-Lab) at the University of Zurich between the hours of 9am and 6pm. 
Before the laboratory session, the participants filled in questionnaires, including the resilience 
questionnaire. For performing the attentional control task, a chin rest was adjusted and 
calibrated before starting the experiment and participants kept their head on the rest whilst 
completing the task. Upon finishing of the experimental task, participants received payment 
and were debriefed. 
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5.3.2.4 Analysis. Data was analyzed using Stata (Stata Inc). Regarding response time 
(RT) scores, in accord with earlier analyses (Monti et al., 2010; Reeck et al., 2012), incorrect 
responses and outliers were excluded, resulting in exclusion of less than 1% of the trials. 
 
Outliers were defined as values 2 standard deviations below or over the grand mean of 
each individual. 
 
We first computed a repeated 2 x 2 factorial ANOVA, with the within-subject 
factors of congruency in the current trial (congruent, incongruent), and congruency in the 
previous trial (congruent, incongruent). Results were followed up with paired t-tests. The 
relationship between RT scores and trait resilience was analyzed using robust regression 
analyses. Alpha levels were set to 0.05. 
 
5.3.3 Results.  
 
 
5.3.3.1 Descriptive group results. A 2 x 2-factorial repeated measures ANOVA with 
the factors congruency in current trial (congruent, incongruent) and congruency in the 
previous trial (congruent, incongruent), we found a significant effect of congruency in the 
current trial, F(1, 40)= 43.35, p < .000, and congruency in the previous trail, F(1, 40)= 7.10,  
 
p= .007, and a significant interaction between congruency in the current and previous trial, 
 
F(1, 40)= 6.33 p= .011. Follow up t-tests showed that responses to current congruent (face 
and word stimuli congruent; M= 663.91 ms, SD= 212.46 ms) were significantly shorter than 
to current incongruent trials (face and word stimuli incongruent; M= 704.50 ms, SD= 243.50 
ms), t(47) = -5.85, p<.000. Congruent previous trail, M= 675.06 ms, SD= 225.20 ms were 
significantly shorter than incongruent previous trials, M= 692.01 ms, SD= 226.68 ms, t(47)= 
-2.47, p= .013. CC scores were significantly different from CI, IC, and II scores (CC= CI 
t(46)=-7.65, p<.000; CC=II, t(46)=-4.04, p=.000; CC=IC, t(46)=-4.60, p<.000). IC was 
significantly difference from CI scores, t(46)=-2.53, p=.015. No other significant differences 
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were found for congruency and incongruency scores (IC=II, t(46)=0.05, p=.959; 
II=CI, t(46)=-1-11, p=.273). 
 
5.3.3.2 Affective Control and Trait Stress Resilience. As hypothesized, greater 
conflict adaptation was positively correlated with higher trait resilience, see figure 2. As can 
be seen in table 3, a robust regression showed that greater conflict adaptation significantly 
predicted higher trait resilience. 
 
Table 2. Affective control predicts trait stress resilience (study 1) 
 
Predictor B Std. Error t B 
 
 
 
 
Affective control .03 .01 .04 .27* 
 
Note: N= 45; Stress resilience was measured with the Stress Resilience Scale (Wagnild & 
Young, 1993). Model: F(2, 42)=3.63, p= .035. 
 
*p< .05.93 
 
 
Study 2 
 
In the second study, we investigated the association between higher 
conflict adaptation and emotion reactivity to a laboratory stressor. 
 
5.3.3 Method. 
 
5.3.3.1 Participants. Sixty-one healthy female volunteers participated (mean age  
 
25.11 years, SD= 5.32) against a monetary compensation of 50 CHF (56 USD) or 3 credit 
points. A telephone screening of previous or current psychiatric illness and previous direct or 
indirect exposure to interpersonal violence was conducted with participants prior to coming 
to the laboratory to minimize the re-traumatization risk. All participants had normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision. They gave informed consent and the local ethic board had 
approved the study.  
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5.3.3.2 Measures and material. 
 
5.3.3.2.1 Affective control task. The experimental task and setup was the same as 
the one used in study 1.  
 
5.3.3.2.2 Materials. The stimuli in the behavioral task were described for study 1. 
The stimuli were presented on a computer monitor (36 x 24 cm
2
) using a Packard Bell laptop 
and Cogent 2000  (http://visilab.ucl.ac.uk/cogent_2000.php) running in MATLAB 
(MathWorks, Natick, MA, USA).  
 
5.3.3.2.3 Laboratory stressor. The film sequence was taken from the screen movie 
“Irrevèrsible” directed by Gaspar Noe (2002). The used sequence was approximately 12 
minutes long and showed a young woman walking through an underpass and then being 
brutally raped. The film sequence has been used and established as a potent stressor in 
previous studies that led to analogue symptoms of posttraumatic stress disorder, such as 
intrusive memories (e.g., Weidmann, Conradi, Gröger, Fehm und Fydrich, 2009).  
 
5.3.3.2.4 Emotional reactivity. Emotional reactivity was measured prior and following 
the stressful film sequences with two scales (i) the short version of the Multidimensional 
Mood State Questionnaire (MDBF; Steyer, Schwenkmezger, Notz, & Eid, 1997) and (ii) the 
Self-Assessment Manikin Scale measuring affective responses (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 
1994). In addition, we analyzed the mood subscale of the MDBF. Similar as in prior studies 
emotional and affective reactivity scores were constructed by subtracting mood and affect 
ratings from after the stressor from those prior to the stressor. This resulted in a mood 
reactivity score (i.e., MDBFpre - MDBFpost) and an affective reactivity score (i.e., SAMpre-
SAMpost). The mean emotional reactivity scores are presented in table 4.  
 
5.3.3.2.3.1 Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire. The Multidimensional Mood 
State Questionnaire indexes psychological state and includes items related to mood, alertness 
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and calmness. For the present study, both the sum score of the MDBF and the mood subscale 
were used. The short version of the MDBF comprises 12 items ranging from 1 ("Not at all") to 5 
("very much") that are added up to a sum score. The mood subscale consists of 4 items asking 
participants to indicate how content, good, bad or uncomfortable they feel at the moment. 
Answers are added up to an overall sum score indexing mood, with higher scores reflecting 
better mood. The MDBF has shown high internal consistency scores, Cronbach 
 
α= .73 to α= .89 (Steyer et al., 1997) and in our sample, Cronbach α was .79 prior and 
.91 following the film sequence. 
 
5.3.3.3.3.2 The Self-Assessment Manikin Scale. (Bradley & Lang, 1994) is a non-verbal 
self-report assessment that measures affective response to stimuli. Participants indicate their 
current affect by choosing one of nine different animated faces ranging from 1 (happy face) to 9 
(unhappy face) on the valence scale. Higher scores indicate more negative affect. 
 
5.3.3.4 Gaze avoidance. Participants indicated the degree to which they deliberately 
directed their gaze away from the film on a 5-point scale from 1("Not at all") to 5 ("Very 
frequently"). 
 
5.3.3.3 Procedure. The experiment took place in a standard laboratory at the 
University of Zurich during the hours of 11 am and 3 pm. Upon arrival the participants were 
informed about the nature of the film sequence and gave their informed content. Participants 
then completed the conflict adaptation task (i.e., the modified emotional Stroop task). 
Thereafter, they viewed the film sequence in a dark room. Two participants found the film 
sequence too stressful and terminated the viewing. All participants filled out mood 
questionnaires including the MDBF and the SAM mood scales before and after the film 
sequence. Following the film sequence, they also filled out a demographic and general 
information questionnaire. 
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Debriefing session took place at from a week after the laboratory session. In the 
session, participants were debriefed, given the possibility to ask questions and reimbursed 
for their participation. Finally, participants were reassured that a registered clinical 
psychologist could provide help in case of disturbances triggered by the film. 
 
5.3.3.4 Analysis. Data was analyzed as described in study 1. The relationship 
between RT scores and emotional reactivity to the stressful film sequence was analyzed with 
correlations and in a robust regression. 
 
5.3.4 Results. 
 
 
5.3.4.1 Descriptive group results. A 2 x 2-factorial repeated measures ANOVA 
with the factors congruency in current trial (congruent, incongruent) and congruency in the 
previous trial (congruent, incongruent), we found a significant effect of congruency in the 
current trial, F(1, 53)= 12.87, p< .000, and congruency in the previous trail, F(1, 53)=6.62, 
p= .010. Follow up t-tests showed that responses to current congruent (face and word stimuli 
congruent; M= 823.60 ms, SD=453.38 ms) were significantly shorter than to current 
incongruent trials (face and word stimuli incongruent; M= 855.44 ms, SD= 369.56 ms), t(60) 
= -2.99, p= .003. Congruent previous trail, M= 828.69 ms, SD= 411.51 ms, and incongruent 
trial, M= 850.33 ms, SD= 422.72 ms, were significantly different, t(60) = -2.03, p= 042. CC 
scores were significantly different from CI, IC, and II scores (CC= CI t(60)=-3.17, p=.002; 
CC=II, t(60)=-4.67, p<.000; CC=IC, t(60)=-5.58, p<.000). No other significant differences 
were found for congruency and incongruency scores (IC= CI t(60)=-0.13, p=.896; IC=II, 
t(60)=0.74, p=.462; II=CI, t(60)=0.72, p=.474). 
 
5.3.4.2 Affective control and emotional reactivity. There were significant correlations 
between conflict adaptation, emotional reactivity (indexed by the MDBF, SAM) and gaze 
avoidance, as shown in table 4. We conducted separate robust regression for the two 
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emotional reactivity measures, controlling for gaze avoidance during the stressful film 
sequence. In addition, we conducted a regression for the whole MDBF scale, thus predicting 
the change in psychological state in response to the stressor with affective control. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Correlation Between Affective Control and (A) Trait Resilience, (B) Mood 
Reactivity to Stress and (C) Affective Reactivity to Stress 
A  
p = .041, r = .27 
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Figure. 2. Correlations between individual affective control scores and (A) self-rated trait stress 
resilience scores (study 1); (B) mood reactivity (study 2); affective reactivity (study 2). 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and Spearman correlations between key variables (study 2) 
 
  M (SD)- 1 2 3 
1.Mood reactivity
1
 6.85(3.87)    
2. Affective reactivity
2
 -2.37 (2.05) -.73***   
3. Affective control 31.56(77.98) -.26* .27*  
4. Gaze avoidance 0.24(0.43) .26* -.25 -.07 
 
 
Note: N= 61; 
1
 Emotional reactivity was measured with the Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire (Steyer et al., 
1997) prior and following the film sequence; 
2
 Measurement of emotional reactivity with the Self Assessment Manikin 
 
Scale (Bradley & Lang, 1994). 
 
*p< .05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
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5.3.4.2.1 Baseline and post-stress mood and affect. Neither affective control,  =.06, 
 
t(58) = 0.39 p = .699., nor gaze avoidance, = -.11, t(58) = -0.85 p = .399, were related with 
 
pre-stressor mood state (i.e., MDBF full scale) R
2
 = .01, F(2, 58) = 0.41, p= .664. Higher 
 
affective control did not significantly predict psychological state after the stressor,  = .18, 
 
t(58) = 1.80, p = .076., but gaze avoidance, , = -.25, t(58) = -2.30, p = .025., predicted better 
 
affective state, R
2
 = .10, F(2, 58) = 3.73, p= .030. As displayed in table 5, neither affective 
control nor gaze avoidance was significantly related to emotional state before the laboratory 
stressor. Emotional state post-stressor significantly predicted by gaze avoidance, with more 
gaze avoidance predicting higher negative mood ratings. Higher affective control predicted 
better mood post-stressor at trend level, p= .090. Higher affective control, but not gaze 
avoidance, predicted better affective state (i.e., SAM scale pre-post) post- stressor 
 
5.3.4.2.2 Mood and affect reactivity. For the mood state (i.e., whole MDBF scale) higher 
affective control predicted less negative change in psychological state after, compared 
 
with before, the stressor,  = -.21, t(58) = -2.57, p = .013., while lower gaze avoidance did 
 
not significantly predicted change in psychological state,  = .24, t(58) = 1.69,  p = .097, and 
 
the model was significant, R
2
 = .11, F(2, 58) = 4.76, p= .012. 
 
As seen in table 5, higher affective control predicted decreased mood reactivity (i.e., MDBF 
mood subscale prior – MDBF mood subscale mood after the stressor) in response to the 
stressful film sequence. Higher affective control and lower gaze avoidance also predicted 
affective reactivity in response to the laboratory stressor, i.e. less increased negative affect. 
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Table 4. Affective control and gaze avoidance predicts emotional reactivity in response to a laboratory stressor (study 2) 
 
 
Predictor Pre-stressor Post- stressor Reactivity 
 
 
 
Model 1: Predicting mood 
 
 
 B Std.error t β B Std.error t Β B Std.error t Β  
Affective control .00 .00 0.44 .05 .01 .01 1.68 .20 -.01 .01 -2.25 -.22*  
Gaze avoidance -.09 .52 -0.18 -.02 -2.43 1.05 -2.30 -.25* 2.46 1.24 -1.99 .27*  
              
Model 2: Predicting affect              
              
 B Std.error t β B Std.error t β B Std.error t Β  
Affective control -.00 .01 -0.10 -.02 -.01 0.00 -2.01 .23* 0.01 .01 2.47 .20*  
Gaze avoidance -.15 .38 -0.39 -.06 0.60 0.60 1.64 .23 -1.14 0.72 -1.57 -.23*  
 
Note: Dependent variable: Emotional reactivity: N= 61; Emotion before stressor: F(2, 58)=0.10, p= .901, R2=.00; Emotion after stressor: F(2, 
58)=3.67, p= .031, R2=.11; Delta emotion: F(2, 57)=3.75, p= .029, R2=.13. Gaze avoidance was measured by a questionnaire after the viewing 
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of the film sequence. Emotional reactivity was measured with the difference score (post- subtracted from pre-stressor scores) on the 
Multidimensional Mood State Questionnaire (MDBF; Steyer et al., 1997). 
 
Affect before stressor: F(2, 58)=0.08, p= .921, R2=.00; Affect after stressor: F(2, 58)=0.05, p= .049, R2=.11; Delta affect: F(2, 58)=034, p= 
 
.034, R2=.10. Affect reactivity was measured with the difference score (post- subtracted from pre-stressor scores) on the Self-Assessment 
Manikin Scale (SAM; Bradley & Lang, 1994). *p< .05. 
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5.3.5 Discussion. The current studies tested the hypothesis that higher affective 
control results in more adaptive stress regulation by examining the role of individual 
differences in affective control in predicting stress resilience. We found that higher affective 
control predicted trait resilience and more adaptive emotional reactivity in response to a 
laboratory stressor. These results are in line with recent theoretical accounts proposing that 
better affective control may lead to resilience through increasing adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies (Gross & Ochsner, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011). 
 
Individuals with higher affective control reported higher trait resilience and lower 
emotional reactivity to a stressor in the present study. A recent study reported that higher 
attentional flexibility to both neutral and emotional stimuli predicted trait resilience (Genet & 
Siemer, 2011). However, these authors used a behavioral task (i.e., attentional flexibility 
task), which does not directly assess affective control, and did not measure emotional 
responses to stressors. Our results are also in line with findings that lower attentional control 
is associated with increased worry and intrusions (e.g., Hagenaars & Putman, 2011; 
Verwored et al., 2008), however, in these studies attentional control was indexed with self-
report measures (e.g., Hagenaars & Putman, 2011; Verwored et al., 2008). Finally, a 
previous study reported that higher perceived stress in response to chronic stress was related 
with lowered attentional control (Gray et al., 2010). However, this study used a switching 
task to assess attentional control (Gray et al., 2009), and affective control is likely to relate 
differently to stress resilience. These prior studies also did not index resilience and emotion 
reactivity. Future studies should investigate the mechanisms governing attentional and 
affective control in relation to resilience. 
 
What attentional mechanisms may promote stress resilience? Recent theoretical 
suggestions point to that higher affective control might in fact lead to better emotion 
regulation that in turn mediates resilience (Troy & Mauss, 2011). The reasons for the 
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improvement of emotion regulation with higher affective control might be that higher control 
enables stronger top-down regulation of attention to emotional stimuli (e.g., Bishop, 2009; 
Foster et al., 2013). This type of early attentional regulation is ongoing during a stressful 
event, and might steer further cognitive, emotional and behavioral reactions (Ehlers & Clark, 
2000; Matsumo & Ekman, 2010; Scherer & Ceschi, 1997). Higher affective control thus 
improves emotion regulation through better control of the stimuli input (e.g., Troy & Mauss, 
2011). Appraisals reflect the perception of a situation, and it has been found that for instance 
positive appraisals about a situations lead to better outcome (Janis, 1983; Skinner & Brewer, 
2002; Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999) and that coping in stressful situations are congruent with 
the appraisals about that situation (Zakowski, Hall, Cousino-Klein, & Baum, 2001). 
Individual differences in attentional control might thus influences stress reactions through 
enabling flexible shifts in focus of what stimuli are processed, and thereby how a situation is 
perceived. Such shifts might for instance enable termination of attention to emotional 
distracters or steering of attention toward stimuli that promote mitigation of stress responses, 
such as attention to positive stimuli (e.g., Totterdell & Parkinson, 1999; Troy & Mauss, 
2011). Taken together, since stimuli that are attended evoke stronger responses, the control of 
emotion through processes such as affective control is important for an adaptive stress 
response (Ochsner & Gross, 2005). However, the interplay between selective attention, 
emotions and behavior is likely to be influenced by additional factors, such as working 
memory capacity and learned biases. Future studies are needed to clarify the relationship 
between affective control, appraisals and behavior. 
 
The current study is not without limitations. First, we used a behavioral task to 
measure affective control that has been previously used in studies measuring affective control 
(Etkin et al., 2007; Monti et al., 2010). Affective control is measured by indexing individual 
differences in congruency sequence effects. However, a few earlier studies have found that 
 
102 
 
feature integration (i.e., episodic memory effects on stimuli-response associations) explain a 
part of such effects (e.g., Egner, 2007; Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004). Although our results 
favored the conflict adaptation model, we did not account for possible feature integration 
effects, as we would have needed substantially larger data set to do so. Future studies could 
take such effects into account. Second, we found that higher affective control predicted trait 
resilience and emotional reactivity to a laboratory stressor. However, the goodness of fit of 
the regression models was moderate, indicating that other factors influence resilience. Such 
factors might include aspects of cognitive change, such as appraisals and working memory 
capacity (Goeschke, 2013). Third, we measured trait resilience and emotional reactivity with 
well-validated self-rating questionnaires that are easy to administer (Steyer et al., 1997; 
Wagnild & Young, 1993). Several other possibilities of measurement could be considered, 
and longitudinal psychological and physiological responses to stressful events might have 
been a more accurate measurement of resilience (Bonnanno, Mancini & Westphal, 2011). 
Further, we assumed that higher emotional reactivity is related with lower resilience. 
Longitudinal measures would have directly assessed this assumption. However, prior 
research has shown that higher emotional reactivity to stressors (i.e., more negative emotions) 
predict worse functioning and more stress-related disorder as long as 10 years after the 
measurement of reactivity (e.g., Charles, Piazza, Mogle, Sliwinski, & Almeida, 2013). 
Finally, it may be questioned whether our results can be generalized to other populations 
exposed to stress. The findings should be replicated in other populations in order to draw firm 
conclusions. 
 
Our results have clinical implications. Deficits in attentional control are common in 
several psychopathologies including depression, anxiety and post-traumatic stress disorder 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Liston et al., 2009). Although knowledge about such 
deficits is crucial, resilience research in healthy and high resilient populations has been 
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sought for as a mean of establishing guidelines for clinical intervention (e.g., Yiend, 2010). 
Increased knowledge about mechanisms governing affective control leading to more 
resilient outcomes could guide both prevention and treatment of stress-related disorder. 
Based on the present results, increasing affective control could be a target for improving 
resilience in stress-exposed populations. Our findings indicate that training to increase 
affective control to emotional stimuli might serve as stress prevention and treatment of 
stress-related disorders. Interestingly, computerized training has recently been shown to 
increase affective control (Schweizer, Grahn, Hampshire, Moobs, & Dalgleish, 2013) and 
such interventions could be applied as stress prevention. 
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6. Discussion 
 
The presented studies used two standardized behavioral tasks to assess individual 
differences in biased attention to emotional stimuli and affective control together with measures 
of resilience. The main hypotheses were that higher biased attention to positive stimuli, as well as 
higher affective control would be related with higher resilience. Our results (referring to all 
studies) were hypothesis conform, showing that higher resilience were related to higher biased 
attention to positive stimuli and higher affective control. In addition, we found evidence (biased 
attention study) for that the higher biased attention to positive stimuli was only predictive of 
resilience in individuals with an additional AB to negative stimuli. 
 
The results are discussed separately for the two presented articles below, starting 
with the finding for biased attention (6.1) followed by the finding for affective control (6.2), 
thereafter methodological considerations for both studies are provided (6.3), and finally 
concluding remarks and future directions are outlined (6.4). 
 
6.1 Biased attention to positive stimuli and trait resilience 
 
We investigated biased attention to emotional stimuli with a standardized behavioral 
task (i.e., modified dot-probe task) together with self-reports of trait resilience in 43 healthy 
participants. The result showed that higher biased attention to positive stimuli was related 
with higher trait resilience. However, biased attention to positive stimuli was predictive of 
resilience only in those participants that had an additional bias to negative stimuli. 
 
Our main finding, that more attention to positive stimuli predict resilience, is in line with 
recently theory suggesting that biased attention to positive stimuli constitute a type of early 
emotion regulation in stressful situations (Todd et al., 2012). According to this account, more 
biased attention to positive stimuli might increase experiences of positive emotion and thereby 
lead to higher resilience. This is indirectly supported by earlier evidence, showing that 
increasing positive mood leads higher biased attention to positive stimuli (Tamir & 
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Robinson, 2007). However, it should be noted that this study did not report whether biased 
attention had an impact on emotion (Tamir & Robinson, 2007). While several earlier studies 
have found a relation between lower biased attention to positive stimuli and higher rates of 
stress-related psychopathology, such as anxiety (Frewen et al., 2007) and vulnerability to 
depression (Joorman & Gotlib, 2010) our study is the first to establish an association 
between biased attention to positive stimuli and trait resilience. 
 
We also found that biased attention to positive stimuli was predictive of resilience only 
in those participants that had an additional bias to negative stimuli. This result together with 
earlier research suggest that that increased biased attention might be more beneficial in 
individuals that tend to have more negative emotions and cognitions (for instance due to genetic 
vulnerability). Our result also suggests that biased attention to positive stimuli might be of 
higher importance in stressful situation, as such situations are associated with more negativity, 
such as increased negative emotions and cognitions (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). 
 
Biased attention to positive stimuli might protect the individual from “tear and wear” in 
stressful situations, by breaking of prolonged stress-reactions. 
 
Our results also suggest that higher attention to positive stimuli is not beneficial in 
individuals that avoid negative stimuli. This finding is indirectly supported by earlier 
evidence. For instance, if attention to positive stimuli functions as avoidance of facing real 
problems it is likely to have only short time benefits, and perhaps lead to increased distress 
later on (e.g., Kross & Ayduk, 2008). It has been found that avoidance as coping is related to 
higher risk of developing depression later on (Felsten, 2002: Holahan, Moos, Holahan, 
Brennan, & Shuttle, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2013). Rather than a single-minded focus on only 
positive stimuli, a relative larger amount of attention to positive stimuli, together with 
selective attention to concrete and real challenges might contribute to resilience (Charney & 
Southwick, 2012). Thus, an adaptive interplay between biased attention to stressor-related 
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stimuli together with biased attention to positive stimuli might constitute a “resilient” 
profile in stressful situations. 
 
It is disputed whether higher biased attention reflects susceptibility to develop both 
positive and negative environmental influences. The susceptibility model suggests that some 
individuals are more prone to develop biases to all types of stimuli (Pluess & Belsky, 2013). 
The model is indirectly supported by evidence showing that some individuals exhibit more 
malleability to ABM interventions (Fox, Zougkou, Ridgewell, & Garner, 2011). Further 
support for this model has been found in a large prospective study with American soldiers 
conducting a dot probe task (negative vs neutral stimuli) before and after military 
deployment (Disner, Beevers, Lee, Ferrell, Hariri, & Telch, 2013). Soldiers that developed a 
strong bias to negative stimuli following deployment had significantly more stress related 
symptomatic (Disner et al., 2013). However, this study did not include positive stimuli, 
making it hard to draw conclusions on whether the result indicates a plasticity to develop 
biases to positive stimuli as well. 
 
In line with preliminary findings pertaining to plasticity in biased attention, a few 
studies have shown that only individual that develop biases to positive stimuli (i.e., higher 
post-ABM level of the bias) show transfer effects to emotional and behavioral measures (e.g., 
Johnson, 2009: Taylor et al., 2010). If larger biases are an expression of plasticity, 
information about an individual’s susceptibility level might provide important clinical 
information. For instance, individuals high on plasticity might be more likely to benefit from 
therapeutic interventions (Harmer & Cowen, 2013). 
 
We found that biased attention to positive stimuli is related with higher stress resilience. 
Our finding might have important clinical implications. Training to attend positive stimuli was 
found in one study to lead to lower stress reactivity (i.e., cortisol, negative emotion) as well as 
better performance (i.e., self-esteem, sales) to work related stress 
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(Dandeneau et al., 2007). This and other similar findings (Li et al., 2008) indicate that 
training to increase biased attention to might stress preventive effects. Future research is 
needed how ABM trainings to increase biased attention to positive stimuli might be used 
in prevention and treatment of stress-related disorder. 
 
6.2 Affective control predicts stress resilience 
 
In two studies healthy participants completed a behavioral task indexing affective 
control together with measures of resilience. In the first (N=48) study, resilience was 
measured with a self-rating questionnaire assessing trait resilience. In the second study 
(N=61), the female participants completed mood and affect questionnaires prior and after a 
standardized laboratory stressor. The result showed that higher affective control was 
related with higher trait resilience in study one and with more adaptive emotion reactivity 
in study two. The results are in accord with recent theoretical accounts suggesting that 
higher affective control leads to higher stress resilience over better emotion regulation 
(Ochnser & Gross, 2005; Troy & Mauss, 2011). 
 
Our results are in line and expand on earlier evidence. To the best of our knowledge, 
the presented study was the first to directly assess if affective control leads to higher stress 
resilience. However, prior evidence has shown that attentional control is lowered both 
during acute and chronic stress (Gray et al., 2009; Plessow et al., 2011a, Plessow et a., 
2011b). However, these studies assessed attentional (i.e., attention to neutral stimuli), and 
not affective (i.e., control to emotional stimuli), control. Attentional and affective control 
might be differently related with resilience, as they seem to be governed by distinct neural 
routes (Egner, 2007). Further, one recent study found that higher affective flexibility to both 
neutral and emotional stimuli was related with higher trait resilience (Genet & Siemer, 
2011). However, this study did not directly assess attentional control and also did not assess 
emotional responses to a laboratory stressor. 
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Given that attentional control decreases in acute and chronic stress (Gray et al., 
2009; Plessow et al., 2011a, Plessow et a., 2011b) and that higher control often is needed in 
such situations (Goeschke, 2010), preserved affective control in stressful situations might be 
characteristic of resilience. 
 
Our results are also in line with earlier findings showing that failure to recruit 
affective control in response to conflict is related with stress-related disorders such as anxiety 
(e.g., Bishop, 2009) and depression (Joorman & Gotlib, 2010). Prior studies showing that 
lower attentional control (assessed with self-report measures) is related with increased worry 
and intrusions in response to stressors (e.g., Hagenaars & Putman, 2011; Verwored et al., 
2008) indicate that failure to recruit affective control seriously affect emotion regulatory 
abilities. The failure to recruit affective control in depression might be related problems with 
terminating negative thoughts and emotions that constitute hallmarks of this disorder 
(Goeschke, 2014). 
 
Our results indicate that increased affective control leads to increased resilience. This 
finding has important clinical implications, because training to increase affective control 
could prove an important prevention and treatment of stress-related disorders. A recent study 
showed that computerized training result in increases in affective control (Schweizer, Grahn, 
Hampshire, Moobs, & Dalgleish, 2013), and such interventions could provide a cost-
effective option for stress prevention. However, current findings are preliminary, and more 
research with both healthy and psychopathological groups is needed before such trainings 
can be recommended. 
 
6.3 Methodological considerations 
 
The designs of the presented studies have both methodological strength and limitations. 
After a general discussion concerning aspects related to all the presented studies, 
methodological strengths and weaknesses are discussed separately for the respective studies. 
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6.3.1 General methodological discussion. In all the presented studies, healthy 
participants were investigated. Research with healthy participants has been strongly suggested 
for two reasons; (1) basic research about selective attention to emotional stimuli in healthy 
participants is lacking and (2) to aid the identification of protective selective attention to 
emotional stimuli (Yiend, 2010). The results from these studies might thus contribute to 
clarification of what patterns of selective attention that might be related with resilience. By 
providing useful information about the character of selective attention in resilient individuals, our 
result might guide the development of prevention and treatment paradigms.  
 
Two of the conducted studies presented in this thesis used a cross-sectional design. 
Studies with such designs cannot deliver causal evidence. In both the cross-sectional studies, 
the attentional parameter (i.e., biased attention to positive stimuli, affective control) was 
associated with higher trait resilience. Because of the study design, we cannot exclude the 
possibility that these attentional parameters are markers, but not precursors of trait 
resilience. Further studies with longitudinal designs are needed to investigate if biased 
attention to positive stimuli and affective control are predictors or markers of resilience. 
Longitudinal studies with baseline measures of resilience and attentional parameters, 
followed by multiple repeated measures of resilience over time would be suitable to explore 
causality. Alternatively, experimental studies including induction of biased attention or 
affective control can be conducted, with follow up measurement of stress reactivity.  
 
Further, in two studies we used a self-rating measure of trait resilience that is cost-
effective. However, other measures of resilience, such as physiological markers, could 
shed light over additional aspects of individual differences in stress resilience.  
 
6.3.2 Methodological consideration article 1. In an experimental study 43 healthy 
participants completed a self-report measure of trait resilience together with a modified dot 
probe task measuring biased attention to emotional stimuli. The relatively cost- and time  
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effective design enabled a throughout investigation into methodological issues such as stimuli 
presentation and target detection difficulty. The investigation was conducted as a row of 
smaller pilot studies preceded the actual study. In these pilot studies, methodological aspects 
of the stimuli presentation (e.g., presentation time) in the dot probe task were varied and the 
result evaluated, contributing to considerable improvement of the initial behavioral task. 
 
6.4.3 Methodological consideration article 2. We conducted two experimental 
studies assessing affective control with a behavioral task (i.e., modified emotional Stroop 
task). In the first study 48 healthy participants completed a self-rating of trait resilience, and 
in the second study 61 healthy female participants completed self-ratings of emotional 
responses before and after a laboratory stressor (i.e., stressful film sequence). 
 
A major strength of these studies was the interpretation of the behavioral data under 
the assumption of conflict adaption. However, it is important to note that both conflict 
adaptation (Botvinick et al., 2001) and feature integration (Hommel et al., 2004) effects 
might contribute to the congruency-sequence effects that were used in our study to index 
affective control affective control (Egner, 2007). On the other hand, a recent literature 
review pointed out that in previous studies, the results with Stroop tasks have mainly been 
driven by conflict adaptation, speaking for that our results reflect mainly conflict adaptation 
(Egner, 2007). Future studies with this behavioral task could include more trials, thus 
enabling modeling of eventual feature integration effects. 
 
Regarding the second study, we included only female participants. This limits the 
interpretation of the result in the general population, and the result should be replicated 
in male participants. 
 
In the second study, we assessed emotional reactions with self-rating questionnaires. 
Other measures of emotion, such as quantification of facial expressions in response to the 
film sequence, might have provided a more objective measure of emotional reactions. 
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6.4 Conclusions and directions for future research 
 
To the best of our knowledge, ours were the first studies to directly investigate how 
stress resilience is related to biased attention to emotional stimuli and affective control. In 
conclusion, our findings suggest that higher biased attention to positive stimuli and higher 
affective control are related with stress resilience. 
 
Future research should replicate these results, and investigate in more detail what 
neurological processes underlie biased attention to emotional stimuli and affective control, 
and how these relate with stress resilience. 
 
Further investigation is needed into the many methodological questions that remain 
open pertaining to biased attention in healthy and psychopathological populations. Such 
methodological research is almost completely lacking with positive stimuli, and it is not well 
known how variations in stimuli intensity and current mood impact biased attention to such 
stimuli. Studies with larger cohorts of participants are needed to conclude if individual 
differences in resilient outcome suggested by prior research are reflected in ABs. 
 
To assess how differences in biased attention and affective control are influenced by 
situational variation in stress, future studies should be conducted under varying levels of 
situational stress. Studies in stressful situations might reveal important information about 
the role of selective attention to emotional stimuli that cannot be captured in non-stressful 
situations. 
 
To identify the character of selective attention associated with highly resilient 
outcome, studies should include highly resilient individuals. The question how to identify 
such individuals remains partly opens, but an ideal study design might include measurement 
of functioning before and after one or several severe stressors, or multiple assessments 
before and during chronic stress. Individuals that under such circumstances do not exhibit 
decreases in functioning might give clues to factors contributing to a resilient outcome. 
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Research is also needed into how to distinguish degrees of resilient outcomes, as 
most research focuses on the absence of psychopathology or preserved functioning. More 
sensitive measure, be it in the form of neural markers or questionnaires, are needed to 
capture degrees of resilience in the non-pathological group. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
Chapter 7 - Concluding remarks 
 
The work presented in this thesis explored that two parameters of selective attention 
to emotional stimuli, i.e. biased attention to emotional stimuli and affective control, might 
underlie stress resilience and stress-related disorders. 
 
This work has been performed under the premises of (i) biased competition and (ii) 
conflict adaptation: 
 
(i) Biased attention arises from individual differences in bottom-up and top-down 
representations. Individual differences in stress resilience arise from 
differences in biased attention that results from interactions between 
environmental input and the individual’s representation of the environment.  
 
Both individual differences in bottom-up and top-down representations of 
emotional stimuli might contribute to resilience outcome.  
 
(ii) Affective control varies with the level of conflict in the previous and 
current situation. This means that individual differences in adaptation 
(i.e., conflict detection and exhibition of top-down control) to conflict in 
an emotional context give rise to differences in resilient outcome.  
 
The research described in this thesis provides (1) experimental evidence for 
an association between higher biased attention to positive stimuli and higher self-
rated resilience, and (2) experimental evidence for an association between higher 
affective control and higher self-rated trait resilience, and (3) evidence for that higher 
affective control predicts better emotion regulation in response to a laboratory 
stressor. This thesis is based on the following publications numbered from I-II (see 
below). These publications comprise original research described in the previous 
chapters of this thesis (Chapters 5). 
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7.1 Summary of original contributions 
 
 
 
 
 
The original contributions of this thesis are summarized as follows: 
 
 
• The experimental study expanded on prior knowledge about the relationship between 
biased attention to positive stimuli and stress resilience. (Publication I). 
 
 
 
• A modified dot-probe task was developed and used, that enables measurement of 
accuracy biases in addition to ABs in RT. (Method, publication I)  
 
 
 
• The second and third experimental studies expanded prior knowledge about the relationship  
 
between affective control and stress resilience (Publication II) 
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7.2 Publications arising from work in this thesis 
 
 
 
 
In submission: 
 
 
 
 
I. Thörn, H., Grushow, M., Ruff, C., Ehlert, U., & Kleim, B. Attentional bias to positive 
stimuli predicts stress resilience. 
 
 
 
II. Thörn, H., Grushow, M., Ruff, C., Ehlert, U., & Kleim, B. Affective control predicts stress 
resilience. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix I Affective and motivational correlates of attentional bias to positive stimuli using a Dot Probe task 
Authors Participants Positive stimuli
a
 Presentation Affective, stress or AB association with affective, stress or 
   duration motivational motivational measures
c
 
   (ms)
a
 measure
b
  
Mood      
Tamir & Robinson, Healthy (N= 95) Positive words 500 Positive mood
d
 AB  positive mood, t(94)=2.63, β =.27** 
2007, study 1      
Tamir & Robinson, Healthy (N= 85) Reward words 300 & 900 Positive mood
d
 AB  positive mood, F(1,82)=8.40*** 
2007, study 2      
Tamir & Robinson, Healthy (N= 68) Positive words 700 Positive mood
d
 AB  positive mood, F(1,67)=5.72* 
2007, study 3      
Tamir & Robinson, Healthy (N= 43) Reward words, 600 Positive mood
d
 AB  positive mood, F(1,44)=4.84* 
2007, study 4  high or low arousal    
Tamir & Robinson, Healthy (N= 74) Reward words, 700 Positive mood
d
 AB  positive mood, F(1,73)=12.38** 
2007, study 5  high or low arousal    
Stress      
Fox et al., 2010 Healthy, baseline Positive images Masked 14, NEO-FFI AB  higher neuroticism, r(102)=-.22* 
 (n= 104), 4 months  300   
 (n= 82) 8 months     
 (n= 70)     
  Masked 14, STAI-S 
  300  
Johnson, 2009 AB instruction group   Happy faces 17, 500, Frustration (Likert 
 (n= 54), C (n= 55), 1250 scale) during – 
 (N = 109; 42 ♂ 67  before stressor 
 ♀)   
  17, 500, Persistence 
  1250 anagram task 
 
AB  lower state ANX during laboratory 
stressor 4 months post, r(82)=-.25* 
 
AB instruction  frustration F(1,53)= 
4.41* 
 
 
AB  longer persistence, r(53) = .29* 
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   17, 500, Persistence 
   1250 anagram task 
Taylor et al., 2010 “individuals with Positive social 500 LSAS-SR 
 difficulty giving words   
 speeches (N= 43; 13    
 ♂ 30 ♀)    
 
AB  longer persistence, r(53) = .32* 
 
 
AB  lower social ANX ,  r(43)= -.41** 
 
 
 
 
AB  lower state ANX baseline, r(43)= - 
.31*  
AB lower ANX during speech, r(43)= - 
.49*** 
 
AB  lower ANX during speech, 
controlling for social anxiety, β = −.31, 
t(42) = −2.02*  
Motivation 
Schultheiss & Hale, Students (N= 52; 23 Joyful and Masked 12, SC Implicit AB  higher affiliation motivation, 
2007, study 1 ♂ 29 ♀) surprised faces 116 & 231 motives: affiliation B=0.91, r=.31* 
Schultheiss & Hale, Students (N= 60; 29 Joyful and Masked 12, SC implicit No association 
2007, study 1 ♂ 31 ♀) surprised faces 116, 231 motives  
 
 
 
Note: N= Negative; NE= Neutral; P= Positive; H= Happy; A= Angry; LSAS-SR, Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale- self report (Liebowitz, 1987); 
SC, self constructed; NEO-FFI, NEO personality Inventory, (Costa & McCRae, 1985); STAI, State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, 
& Lushen, 1983). 
 
a
 Some studies used several stimuli conditions, in such cases the result relevant presentation time is in boldface. In some studies, all trials were added 
up into one AB score, in such cases both presentation times are in boldface. 
 
b
 Main outcome variables relevant for results with AB to positive stimuli. 
  
c All results pertaining to AB to positive stimuli; Significance level as indicated: *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001.   
d Mood as follows: study 1, naturalistic mood measurement over a week; study 2, sad, neutral, and happy mood induction; study 3, anxious and   
positive mood induction; study 4, negative and positive visual mood induction; study 5, negative and positive music induction. 
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e
 fMRI study, fMRI results reported in the neural chapter. 
  
f In contrast with other studies in this table, this study included both adult and child participants (9-40 yrs).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
149 
Appendix II Clinical correlates of attentional bias to positive stimuli using a Dot-Probe task 
Authors Participants Positive Presentation Clinical measures
b
 AB association with clinical measure
c,d
 
  stimuli duration
a
   
   (ms)   
Clinical Anxiety       
Bradley & GAD n= 14; 7 ♂ 7 ♀), Happy faces 500, 1250 n.n. 
Mogg, 1999 HC (n= 33; 13 ♂ 20 ♀)     
Deperro et al., PTSD (N= 27 ♀ 27) Positive 1000 PCL 
2013  words    
Fani et al., PTSD symptoms Happy faces 500 PSS, CTQ 
2010 (N=129; 37 ♂ 92 ♀)     
Mogg et al., Social ANX (n = 15, 8 Happy faces 500, 1250 MINI, FNE, BDI 
2004 ♂ 7 ♀), HC (n= 15; 8 ♂     
 7 ♀)     
Stevens et al., Social phobia (n= 40; Happy faces 175, 600 SCID 
2009
e
 
16 ♂ 24 ♀), HC (n= 
 
40) 
 
AB GAD (F(1,45)= 15.75*) 
 
No association 
 
AB  childhood maltreatment (r= .25**) 
AB  avoidance and numbness (r= .19*) 
 
AB  than AB to angry in ANX 
(t(13)= 2.58*) 
 
AB ANX (d=-.62) 
AB MDD (d= -.58*) 
No association 
 
Non-clinical anxiety in student populations 
Bradley et al., High ANX (n = 20), Happy faces 500, 1250 POMS (ANX, MDD, AB  ANX (t(36)=2.58*) 
 
1998 low ANX (n= 20)   vigor), STAI-T, SDS, AB than zero ANX (t(18)= 2.20*) 
 
    BDI AB trait ANX (r= -.32*)  
      
     AB MDD (r= -.43*) 
 
Brosschot et Low MCS/low ANX Positive 500 STAI, MCS No association 
 
al., 1999 (n= 15), low MCS/ words    
 
 high ANX (n= 15),     
 
 high MCS/ high ANX     
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 (n= 15), low MCS/ low    
 ANX (n= 10), low    
 MCS/ high ANX (n=    
 8), (N= 69; 19 ♂ 50 ♀)    
Dewitte et al., High/low ANX (N= 39; Positive 500 ECR-r 
2007 7 ♂ 32 ♀) words   
Eldar et al., ANX  (N= 23; 6 ♂ 17 Happy faces 500 STAI 
2010
f
 female), low-ANX (N=    
 23; 10 ♂ 13 ♀)    
Fox, 2002, High/low ANX (N= 32; Happy faces 500 STAI 
study 1 12 ♂ 20 ♀)    
Fox, 2002, High ANX (n= 18), Happy faces Masked 17 STAI 
study 2 low ANX  (n= 18) (N=    
 36, 10 ♂ 26 ♀)    
Keogh et al., High/ low physical Positive 500 physical ASI 
2001 ANX (N= 100; 20 ♂ 80 words   
 ♀)    
Mansell et al., High FNE and threat Positive 500 FNE 
1999 (n= 15, 5 ♂ 13 ♀), low faces   
 FNE and threat (n= 16,    
 8 ♂ 8 ♀), high FNE no    
 threat (n= 20; 7 ♂13    
 ♀), low FNE no threat    
 (n= 20; 9 ♂ 11 ♀)    
Mogg & High/ low MD / ANX Happy faces Masked 14 FNE, POMS 
Bradley, 1999 (N= 35)    
Pishyar et al., High /low social ANX Positive 500 FNE 
2004, Study 1 (N= 33; 5 ♂ 28 ♀) words   
Pishyar et al., High/low social ANX Positive 500 FNE 
2004 Study 2 (N= 29; 5 ♂ 24 ♀) face   
 
 
 
 
 
No association (F(1,44)= 0.00, d= .00) 
 
 
No association 
 
 
 
AB  ANX in LVF than low ANX (t(30) = 
1.83*) 
 
AB  ANX than zero (t(15) = 2.03*) 
AB low ANX in RVF (t(17)= 2.1*) 
 
 
 
AB ANX, AB  low ANX 
(F(1,49)=4.08*) 
 
AB  emotional faces (incl. negative) 
ANX (t(29)= 3.0**) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No association 
 
No association 
 
AB  low ANX (F(1,31)= 3.82*) 
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  profiles
g
    
Shrootens & High ANX (n= 24), low Positive 14, 500 STAI, MCS AB ANX (F(1,45)= 4.0*) 
Smulders, ANX (n= 26) words    
2010      
Vassilopoulos, High ANX (n= 26; 2 ♂ Positive 200, 500 FNE No association 
2005 24 ♀)/ low ANX (n= words    
 26; 9 ♂ 17 ♀)     
Yu et al., 2013 ANX (n= 11 ♂ 7 ♀), Positive 100, 500, FNE AB  ANX than HC (t(33) = 3.06, 
 HC (n= 9 ♂ 8 ♀) social 1250  p < .01, d= 1.03) 
  words    
Clinical depression     
Gotlib et al., MDD (n= 19), GAD Positive 1000 SCID AB  than AB to sad in MDD 
2004 (n= 18), HC (n= 16), all faces   (t(18)=1.19*) 
 ♀     
Mingtian et MDD (n= 24; 7 ♂ 18 Positive 100, 500  AB never MDD (t(47)= -4.69***) 
al., 2011
f
 ♀), never- MDD (n= images    
 24; 7 ♂ 18 ♀)      
Non-clinical depression  
Shane & High/low DYS (N= 97; Positive 500, 1500 BDI, differential AB 
Peterson, 29 ♂ 66 ♀) images  scores (AB to positive 
2007, study 1    – AB to negative), 
Shane et al., High/low DYS (N= 81; Positive 200, 1500 BDI, differential AB 
2007, study 2 30 ♂ 51 ♀) words  scores (positive – 
    negative) 
 
AB  in non-DYS (t(70)=2.13, 
d=.50*) AB  DYS (β =-.28*) 
 
 
AB DYS (t(25)=2.51, d=.55*) 
 
AB non-DYS (t(63)=3.39, d=.85** ) 
AB  lower DYS (β =-.26*)  
Depression vulnerable population 
Chan et al., High-neurotic, never Positive Masked 14,   EPQ No association 
2007 MDD (n=33; 11 ♂ 22 words 500  
 ♀), low-neurotic (n=    
 32; 14 ♂ 18 ♀)    
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Bipolar disorder 
Jabben et al., Bipolar (N= 77), Positive 500 n.n AB  MDD than relatives (p= .02), HC 
2012 euthymic (n= 60), words   (p= .013), euthymic (p< .01) 
 MDD (n= 17), first-     
 degree relatives (N=     
 39), HC (N= 61)     
Jongen et al., Bipolar: mild MDD (n= Positive 500 HRSD, YMRS AB to emotional (incl. negative) MDD 
2007 16; 9 ♂ 7 ♀), euthymic words   (F(1,30)=5.1, p= .03, n
2
=14) 
(n= 13; 6 ♂ 7 female),  
HC (n= 29) 
 
Note: GAD, Generalized Anxiety Disorder; ANX, Anxiety; MDD, Major Depression Disorder; DYS, Dysphoria; LVF, left visual field; RVF, 
right visual field; HC, healthy control.  
In alphabetic order: ASI, Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986); BDI, Beck Depression Inventory (Beck, Ward, 
Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961; CTQ, the Childhood Trauma Questionnaire (Bernstein & Fink, 1998); ECR-r, the Experiences in Close; 
Relationships Scale revised (Fraley, Waller & Brennan, 2000); EPQ, Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985); FNE, Fear of 
Negative Evaluation (Watson & Friend, 1969); HRSD, Hamilton Ratings Scale Depression (Hamilton, 1960); LSAS, Liebowitz Social Anxiety Scale 
(Liebowitz, 1987); MCS, Marlow Crow Social Desirability Scale (Hermans, 1967); MINI, Mini International Neuro-psychiatric Interview (Lecribier, 
Weiller, Bonara, Amorine, & Lépine, 1994); PCL, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder Checklist (Weathers, Litz, Herman, Huska, & Keane, 1993); POMS, 
Profile of Mood States (McNair, Lorr, & Droppleman, 1981); PSS, modified PTSD Symptom Scale (Falsetti, Resnick, Resik, & Kilpatrick, 1993); 
SCID, Structured Clinical Interview for the DSM IV (Wittchen, Wunderlich Gruschwitz., & Zaudig, 1997); SDS, Social Desirability Scale (Crowne 
& Marlowe, 1964); STAI-T, State Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorusch, & Lushene, 1983); YMRS, Young Mania Rating Scale (Young, 
Biggs, Ziegler, & Meyer, 1978). 
 
a
 Some studies used several stimuli presentation times, in such cases the result relevant presentation time is in boldface. In some studies, all trials 
were added up into one AB score, in such cases both presentation times are in boldface. 
 
b
 Main outcome variables relevant for results with AB to positive stimuli. 
  
c All results pertaining to AB to positive stimuli; Significance level as indicated: *<0.05, **<0.01, ***<0.001.   
d AB to negative or other stimuli mentioned only when compared with AB to positive stimuli.   
e The study, Stevens et al., 2009, included the conditions before/after drinking alcohol/orange juice.   
f EEG study   
g Half of the profiles were images of the participant self.  
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